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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The argument advanced is this thesis is that the entities that make up the 
environment are those that do not owe their origin to any willful creative activity but 
have evolved through accidental natural processes.  This fact of not being willfully 
created makes the environment ontologically independent and confers on it intrinsic 
value as opposed to instrumental value.  This intrinsic value is one that all the entities that 
make up the environment share.  It is further argued that this intrinsic value is aesthetic 
rather than moral.  Only beings that are specially endowed with certain capacities, like 
reflection and understanding, could be said, in the context of this work, to have intrinsic 
moral value in the sense of being moral agents.  But as moral agents, we need to give 
moral considerability to all the natural entities in the environment since they share the 
same natural right with us, based on our common origin.   So, even though the 
nonhuman, natural entities in the environment do not have moral rights, they have natural 
rights.  It is further argued that this natural right could be best safeguarded in a legal 
framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Wonder! Our environmental consciousness begins with wonder.   Most 
environmentalists, of differing persuasions and disciplines, attest to this fact.  We see things 
around us, and we marvel at them in a spontaneous manner.  Philosophy was actually founded 
on this wonder about the nature of the entities that surround us.  This is why the pre-Socratics, 
who laid the foundation for philosophy as a discipline, have been described as physicists.  
They went beyond just being awed by the natural entities around them to a careful observation 
of the processes those entities undergo.  They observed that both they and the entities were 
changing in a perpetual manner.  They then began to inquire into what could be permanent so 
as to underlay that change. It is remarkable that these thinkers thought that all organic entities 
in the universe were made up of inorganic substances, instead of looking beyond the world for 
their origin.  For Thales, for example, it was water, for Anaximenes, it was air, and for 
Anaximander, it was what he called the indeterminate boundless, that was permanent. For 
Heraclitus, it was change itself, brought about by fire, which was permanent. The investigation 
and observations of these thinkers led them to posit that there are four underlying elements for 
all the entities in the universe, namely, water, air, fire, and earth.  So, these four elements were 
isolated as being permanent in the midst of all the observable changes. This inquiry was to 
culminate in Plato, who postulated that there is a world of Forms that is devoid of change.  
That was, for Plato, the real world.  The world we live in is but an illusion, at best, an 
imitation of that real world of Forms.  With this theory, Platonism launched an ontological 
devaluation of the world we know, calling it an illusion that human beings are, in a way, 
condemned to pass through before getting to the real world.  Arguably therefore, our world, in 
Plato’s postulation, has no real worth of its own except to refer us to a better, real and perfect 
world of unchangeable Forms. 
 So what began as a wonder that led to physical inquiries by the pre-Socratics (a 
wonder that had some beautiful expressions, as we shall see later in Heraclitus, for instance); 
became in Platonism a distinctly metaphysical enterprise, leading to a very sharp dualism 
between what is real and what is apparent.  But seeing nature or the environment1 as simply a 
mere appearance is not unique to Platonism, nor did it originate with it.  As we shall see, some 
                                                          
1 These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this work. 
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religious and cultural traditions hold similar theories about the environment.  However, 
Christianity—or Christendom—which Nietzsche aptly described as “Platonism for ‘the 
people’”2 exhibits a more distinct Platonic influence in its theoretical (philosophical and 
theological) foundation, especially in its understanding of the environment and the place of 
human beings in it.  This is because Christian dogma has taught, not only that human beings 
are essentially different from nature, but also that she is God’s gift to them, to do with as they 
wished. 
My aim in this work is to appeal again to that initial wonder that is at the foundation 
of our environmental consciousness.  I am therefore arguing firstly that we are part of the 
environment, a clever part to be sure, secondly, that the environment does not depend on us 
for its existence.  In other words, our knowledge of the environment depends on the way it is 
so that what we do is try to describe what we see. It is not our knowledge that determines what 
is there but rather what is there that determines our knowledge or description.  I also argue that 
the environment is not purposely brought about by any agent whatsoever.    There is no 
invisible world on which this world depends for its being.  An adequate account of the 
environment requires that we reject conceptions of reality which include the noumenal world 
or world of forms.  These are concepts that have no basis whatsoever in reality except in the 
minds of those who conceive them. I argue that there is no creator who created the world for 
whatever purpose such a creator may have in mind.  As Emma Goldman says, “Only after the 
triumph of the Atheistic philosophy in the minds and hearts of man will freedom and beauty 
be realized.  Beauty, as a gift from heaven has proved useless.  It will, however, become the 
essence and impetus of life when man learns to see in the earth the only heaven fit for man.”3 
Once we see that nature has no purpose, we are able to recognize both its ontological 
independence and its intrinsic value.  These qualities of the environment should elicit an 
attitude of respect from us.  This attitude of respect, I posit, should be tied to the intrinsic 
aesthetic value of the environment.  My main aim in this work is to explore how this attitude 
of respect could be best realized. 
The major issues I am dealing with in this thesis, therefore, are: What is the 
environment? Does the environment have ontological independence?  Does it have intrinsic 
value?  What should be our attitude to the environment?  On what can a viable ethic of the 
                                                          
2 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil, prelude to a philosophy of the future, preface. 
3 Emma, Goldman. Anarchism and Other Essays, p. 415. 
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environment be founded?  The thesis itself sets out to show that a viable environmental ethic 
can be founded on the intrinsic aesthetic value of the environment. 
In the first chapter, I take a look at the attitude of some religions and cultures to the 
environment.   As already mentioned, we see a markedly dualistic attitude regarding the 
environment in these cultures and religions.  I want to show that the major weakness of these 
cultures and religions lies in this dualism. I start with the Igbo (African) traditional religion 
and culture and examine briefly its attitude to the environment.  We shall see how this system 
cultivated reverence for the environment and why.  In the same way, I will touch on 
Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity and their attitudes to the environment.  Lynn White, in 
his well known article from the seventies, namely, “The Historical Root of Our Ecological 
Crisis”4 has argued that Christian dogma is responsible for the current environmental crisis we 
are facing.  White’s point is that Christian dogma taught people not only to see themselves as 
essentially different from nature but to also see it as their property, given to them by God.  As 
Christianity—which is a conquering religion—took root in the West and as the West became 
the dominant cultural, political, economic and scientific force in the world, this attitude 
became pervasive.  This, then, led to the despoliation of our planet and has left us with the 
environmental crisis we are having to deal with now.  I briefly examine this problem as well as 
the difficulties inherent in the other religions and cultures mentioned.  The views of some of 
those who think that White’s criticism is misplaced will also be appraised.  The chapter is 
called the problem because in all these religions and cultures, respect for the environment is 
primarily based on the invisible world, the abode of God, spirits, ancestors, deities, and other 
invisible forces.  What this means is that the respect or reverence shown to the entities in the 
environment is likely to be done in obeisance, supplication, or simply in a bid to be in 
harmony with these extra-terrestrial entities.  What this shows is that the natural entities do not 
really have any worth of their own once they are no longer seen as a link to these supposedly 
“higher” beings.  Another difficulty is that this approach is invariably selective.   For instance, 
a tree or a river that is believed to harbour the spirits of ancestors or relatives will receive 
much more respect than other trees or rivers that are not seen as such.  Respect or reverence 
for the entities in the environment is therefore grounded on how important their other-worldly 
connections are.  This results in an approach to the environment which is removed from nature 
                                                          
4 This article first appeared in Science, Vol. 155, pp 1203-1207 (10 March 1967). 
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itself.  This mediated respect for the environment is weak in a way that a direct connection to 
the environment is not. 
The second and third chapters deal with the arguments that respect for the 
environment should not go beyond the entities themselves.  This is because, given their nature, 
they are worthy of such respect on their own.   In exploring their nature, I talk of their 
ontological independence, which is the subject of the second chapter.  What is the justification 
of this independence?  I argue that the source of this justification is to be found in the origin of 
the environment which is as a result of independent and accidental natural processes.  This 
will point to the fact that the environment has no purpose as such, in contradistinction from 
artifacts whose origin depends on their willful creators who create them for a purpose.  It is in 
this second chapter that I define the environment.  This chapter also addresses the issue of 
accidental creations and reproduction and human idealism (or narrow anthropocentrism) as an 
obstacle to recognizing the ontological independence of the environment.  As human beings, 
we construct things, physically and mentally.  But the environment, of which we are but a part, 
is not our creation.  The main thrust of the chapter is therefore the origin and purpose—or lack 
of it—of the environment.  In the light of the purposelessness of the environment, can the 
theory of creation ex nihilo hold, for instance? 
The argument for the ontological independence of the environment leads to the 
argument for its intrinsic value, which is the subject of Chapter Three.   Again, purpose and 
purposelessness as it concerns the environment are crucial to the argument of this chapter.  I 
contrast intrinsic value with instrumental value in order to show that whereas natural entities 
have intrinsic value first and foremost and then may accidentally have instrumental value, 
artifacts have only instrumental value.  I also argue that the intrinsic value of the environment 
is aesthetic and not moral.  I argue in favour of the aesthetic value of the environment.  This is 
because I take it, for my purposes here, that only humans are moral agents and so we cannot 
talk of morality in the context of environmental philosophy as if non-human natural objects 
are moral agents. Again, morality in its religious sense, usually means the “will of God”.  In 
this sense, what is moral would be what is pleasing to God.  This generally disconnects the 
issue of how we should treat the environment from the environment itself.  Aesthetic value, on 
the other hand, is centered on the things themselves, on the way they actually are and does not 
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seek to find their worth as based on anything outside themselves.  Their aesthetic worth also 
does not depend on any concept or law to which they must absolutely conform. 
In arguing that the environment has intrinsic aesthetic and not moral value, I rely, 
among others, on Kant who distinguished between the way we appreciate what is natural on 
the one hand, and the way we appreciate what is artificial on the other.  For Kant, the 
appreciation of natural objects is subjective, grounded on feelings and conceptless.  But 
artifacts are creations, created with the concepts in the minds of their creators.  The 
appreciation of artifacts must therefore largely conform to the concepts of their creators. 
In the last part of the chapter, I attempt to see if other beings, apart from humans, 
happen to value these natural entities, would it then prove that their value does not depend on 
human beings but are intrinsic? 
The fourth and last chapter explores the relationship between the aesthetic value of the 
environment and environmental ethics.  I argue that the recognition of the intrinsic aesthetic 
value of the environment could be an adequate ground for promulgating laws that could reflect 
such values.  I will also argue, following Spinoza, that recognizing the intrinsic value of the 
environment does not mean that we could not appropriate it for our own good.  What is 
important is how and why we do it.  The conclusion will affirm that a viable environmental 
ethic could therefore be based on the intrinsic aesthetic value of the environment. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE PROBLEM 
“Human belief and practice mark  the earth.  
One can hardly think of a natural system that 
has not been considerably altered, for better 
or worse, by human culture.”5
 
 
I.1. INTRODUCTION 
Sociologists, psychologists, medical practitioners, and some other professionals, 
define wellness as a balance and harmony.  They are always quick to point out the relationship 
between wellness and health where the latter is not just the absence of disease but rather a 
sense of complete physical, mental and social well-being in living organisms.  According to 
Phil Brown, “…health and illness cannot be understood simply by looking at biological 
phenomena and medical knowledge.  Rather, it is necessary to situate health and illness in the 
framework of larger political, economic, and cultural forces.”6  Some philosophers, notably 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, are fond of talking of an imaginary “State of Nature” where this balance 
and harmony were maintained until quite recently.  We are realizing more and more that our 
planet may not be as healthy as we may want to believe. There now seems to be a general 
agreement that we have an environmental crisis to deal with on our planet.  We are realizing 
with each passing day that the earth may not continue to sustain the kind of impact being put 
on her by the entities in her bosom, especially human beings.  Peacock lists some of these 
impacts: “…soil erosion, escalating desertification, deforestation, depletion of fisheries, 
extinctions of plant and animal species, various forms of pollution both subtle and overt, 
nuclear waste and leakage, overpopulation, depletion of petroleum reserves, global warming, 
the ozone hole, urban and industrial garbage, loss of productive land to urbanization, 
stripmining and industrialization, and the ever-growing burden of human poverty.”7
Peacock’s list seems to restrict the activities on the environment to human beings.  
However, it is important to point out that every organism impacts its environment in one way 
                                                          
5 Sullivan, Lawrence E.  In the preface, Buddhism and Ecology p.xi, edited by Mary Evelyn Tucker and 
Duncan Ryuken Williams. 
6  Brown, Phil. Perspectives in Medical Sociology, p. ix. 
7 Peacock, Kent A.  Living with the Earth, an introduction to environmental philosophy, 
p. 9. 
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or another.  The amount, quality, and sort of gas that is present in the environment affects all 
the living organisms in the atmosphere.  Plants affect the soil as they sink in their roots.  Every 
organism in the environment affects every other organism in the environment either directly or 
indirectly. Every living organism affects its environment, even if it is only through respiration.  
But whereas the activities of other entities in the environment are mostly spontaneous, those of 
human beings are more willful.   According to Lewontin, “…we certainly have a power that 
other organisms do not have, both to change the world extremely rapidly and, by willful 
activity, to change the world in various ways that we may think beneficial.”8
From the foregoing, it is clear that human beings’ activities have the greatest effect on 
the environment.  Of all the entities in the environment, human beings are the ones whose 
interaction with the environment has been most problematic.  In the last two millennia at least, 
there has been a pervasive belief that the environment is primarily for human beings to do with 
as they please.  This is because we like to think of ourselves as different from the rest of 
nature, despite arguments from philosophers like Nietzsche and thinkers of all persuasions 
who state that human beings are really not different from nature.  According to John Seeds, the 
more we assimilate the implications of evolution, the more we feel less alienated from the rest 
of nature and begin to identify with all of nature as made up of the same components as we 
are.9 Also, as Aldo Leopold has pointed out, “The land ethic changes the role of homo sapiens 
from conqueror of land community to plain member and citizen of it.  It implies respect for his 
fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.”10
As the opening epitaph says, human belief and culture affect the environment. The 
role religion and religious practices play in informing the way human beings treat the 
environment has been largely overlooked by some environmentalists who lay more emphasis 
on the role science and technology play on the way we treat the environment.  According to 
Sullivan,  
Ignorance of religion prevents environmental studies from achieving its goals, however, 
for though science and technology share many important features of human culture with 
religion, they leave unexplored essential wellsprings of human motivation and concern 
that shape the world as we know it.  No understanding of the environment is adequate 
                                                          
8  Ibid, p. 160 
9  Seed , John. “Anthropocentrism” in Deep Ecology, Quoted in Rowlands Mark,  Environmental Crisis p. 
169 
10 Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic” in A Sand County Almanac, p.219-220. 
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without a grasp of the religious life that constitutes the human societies which saturate the 
natural environment.11   
 
 Some cultures and religions hold that human beings are essentially different 
from nature while others do not.  Why have human beings been thought of as essentially 
different or not different from the rest of nature?  What are the consequences of such views?  
These are the issues I want to deal with in this chapter.  I will talk briefly of three religious 
traditions: Igbo (African), Eastern and Western.  I chose these three because I believe they 
could be taken to represent—more or less—the dominant contemporary religious tendencies 
towards the environment.   I begin with Igbo12 (African) traditional religion and culture. 
 
I.2. IGBO CULTURE, RELIGION AND ATTITUDE TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
What marks the Igboman’s attitude to the environment is respect and reverence, 
which is informed by his religious beliefs. God is believed to be in heaven (identified as the 
sky) which is his exclusive abode while the earth is for human beings.  So, although God lives 
in heaven, his spirit permeates the earth.  Everything in the universe is believed to be created 
by him.  It is absolutely important for the Igboman to live in harmony with nature as that 
means living in harmony with God whose spirit is present in his creation.  This is why the 
Igboman reveres nature and strives to live in harmony with her.13  Both animate and inanimate 
entities (objects) are worshipped and revered as being essential to human well being and for 
general harmony in nature. 
                                                          
11 Sullivan, Lawrence E. op.cit., p.xiii.   
12 Context is very important here.   In Nigeria for instance, there are more than 250 ethnic groups and 
each group has something that differentiates it from the others. It would be naïve to talk of a 
Nigerian culture or religion.  It would be misleading or at best naïve to talk of African or Nigerian 
culture or traditional religion in a homogenous sense.  Talking of African traditional religion without 
qualification would make little or no sense to anybody who has any knowledge of the African way of 
life.  Such a person would readily ask you: ‘Which Africa are you talking of?  Are you talking of the 
Akan or the Zulu, the Kikuyu or the Dinka, the Igbo or the Ewe, etc, etc.?’  If it is Nigerian 
traditional religion, the person is likely to ask ‘Are you talking of the Tiv or the Ogoni, the Edo or 
the Birom, the Igbo or the Hausa, the Yoruba or the Kumo, etc, etc.?’  In my case, I will be talking of 
the Igbo traditional religion which, even though it has variations here and there, has the same basic 
tenets.   I must add here, though, that the traditional Igbo and African  attitude to the environment 
merits a more detailed study than I can undertake here.  In any case, whenever Africa or African 
appears in this work, it should be taken to refer to the Igbo culture and religion. 
13 I use the male gender for God and the female gender for Nature in this section on Igbo culture and 
religion.  This does not mean that I am arguing that God is male while Nature is female.  The Igbo culture 
culture saw God as male and Naure or the earth as a goddess.  I am only referring to it as a historical fact. 
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The earth, from which the Igbo gets his nourishment, is worshipped and revered as a 
goddess.  Before digging any hole in the ground, either for building a house, for planting 
crops, for building a road, for burying the dead, etc, the Igboman seeks a kind of permission 
from the earth goddess.  This usually takes the form of propitiation and appeasement.  The 
planting season and the period of harvesting are particularly reserved for paying homage to 
Ani or the earth goddess.  In some communities, whole weeks are consecrated to the goddess 
during which certain activities are to be avoided in order to honour her and ask for her favour, 
as we can see from what Chinua Achebe says of it.  Here, it is the priest of the goddess who 
addresses a member of the town, Okonwo, who had violated the week of peace by beating his 
wife.  “‘You are not a stranger in Umuofia.  You know as well as I do that our forefathers 
ordained that before we plant any crops in the earth we should observe a week in which a man 
does not say harsh words to his neighbour.  We live in peace with our fellows to honour our 
great goddess of the earth without whose blessing our crops will not grow.  You have 
committed a great evil.”14 Disrespect for the goddess is usually believed to result in poor 
harvest and consequently death (from starvation). During the harvesting period, the goddess is 
also celebrated.  Throughout Igboland, this is usually done in the form of New Yam Festivals 
that have survived to this day.  Again, as Achebe noted, talking about Umuofia: “The feast of 
the New Yam was approaching and Umuofia was in a festive mood.  It was an occasion for 
giving thanks to Ani, the earth goddess and the source of all fertility.”15   The earth goddess 
holds a central and crucial position in the Igbo cosmogony and theory of the universe because 
of the roles she plays in the life of human beings, animals and plants.  According to Achebe, 
“Ani played a greater role in the life of the people than any other deity.  She was the ultimate 
judge of morality and conduct.  And what was more, she was in close communion with the 
departed fathers of the clan whose bodies are committed to earth.”16  It was believed that the 
earth goddess could reject and indeed did reject that some people be buried in her bowel if 
they died of certain illnesses that are considered to be punishments from her for disobeying 
her rules.  Hills, mountains, rivers, forests, oceans, the sun, the moon, plants, and animals are 
similarly worshipped and revered.  Most forests have days in which one should not go into 
them without incurring the wrath of the gods.  Trees can also be cut down in the forests only 
                                                          
14 Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart, p. 22. 
15  Ibid, p. 26. 
16 Ibid, p. 26. 
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after due consultation with the priests of the gods who own the forests.  There are forests 
whose gods do not want to be disturbed so they are left alone and no one goes into them 
except on special occasions and with the permission of the gods, through their priests.  Hills, 
mountains, rivers, and oceans also have their gods.  If, for instance, a project like road 
construction would pass through a particular hill or mountain, the gods are first consulted to 
seek their permission and blessing.  Until such permission is obtained, from the priests, the 
project will be not be executed.  This is also true of rivers, springs, streams, oceans, etc.  
Respect for them entails that things are not dumped in them indiscriminately.  They are 
regularly kept clean and sacrifices are made to them to appease them from time to time.  This 
is particularly true of rivers where people are often drowned.  They are held in special awe and 
everybody tries to avoid going against their rules, like not going in them in certain days of the 
week, etc.  The rules of these gods are enacted as taboos and it is through them that respect for 
the environment is inculcated in the larger populace.  It was not unheard of that human beings 
were sometimes sacrificed to appease the gods.  But it is important to note here that the gods 
do not abhor things because they are taboos, rather they are taboos because the gods abhor 
them.  And the gods speak only through the priests and elders.  What it boils down to is that 
the elders are the sages who make the rules for the respect of the environment and these rules 
are given divine provenance and authority in the form of taboos. 
It is therefore very important to the Igbo that he lives in harmony with the 
environment. When objects like rivers, hills or forests are abused, the Igbo sees it as 
desecration and tries to make amends. It is generally believed that if a river, tree, land, or a 
forest, etc, is desecrated, it would always have adverse effects (like poor harvest, untimely 
death, barrenness, etc) if not on the perpetrators, then certainly on their descendants. So these 
objects are treated with reverence, even when they are to be used to meet human needs. A 
farmer who mistakenly breaks a tuber of yam humbly apologizes to it.  As Ede noted, 
speaking of the Igbo cultural way of handling material things: “Take the farmer’s way of 
handling his yams. When he gathers his yams into his barn, he handles them with care. If it 
happens that in the process of lifting the tuber of the yams, it falls and breaks on the ground, 
he immediately picks up the broken pieces whispering thus: ‘Ezeji amaro uma kwuli gi.’— 
(king of yams, I did not willfully break you).”17  Similarly, a person who wants to slaughter an 
                                                          
17 Edeh, Emmanuel M.P. Towards An Igbo Metaphysics, p. 78. 
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animal would first “talk” to the animal, explaining that he is not doing it out of hatred or 
disdain.  
This does not mean that there are no abuses of the environment in the Igbo world.  
Abuses are, as a matter of fact, fairly wide-spread among peoples of the world. But basically 
the Igbo attitude to the environment is one that lays emphasis on harmony and not on 
dominion. My problem with the system, as I will show later, is that the harmony sought and 
maintained does not refer directly so much to the entities themselves as to what they represent.  
However, what most Westerners see as unthinkable, as Stone pointed out, that is, giving some 
sort of right to the environment18 was not unthinkable to the Igbo.  Here, of course, the right is 
religious and its legality is seen only through the religious framework since the Traditional 
Igbo society was theocratic. The Igbo sees himself as an intrinsic part of God’s nature and 
therefore endeavours to treat every entity in the way she believes will be pleasing to God.  As 
Tembo observes, the African “…does not begin by distinguishing himself from the object, the 
tree or stone, the man, or animal. He does not keep it at a distance. He does not analyze it. 
Once he has come under its influence, he takes it like a blind man still living, into his hands. 
He does not fix it or kill it.19   The Igbo believes in perpetual re-incarnation. So, life after death 
is the same as life before death all played out here on earth and nowhere else. And it is hoped 
that the more one re-incarnates, the more she improves in her character and personality. The 
inability to “come back” to the earth is what the Igbo dreads most.  One sees a similar thought 
in Nietzsche, where Zarathustra was preaching fidelity to the earth.  “I beseech you, my 
brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of 
otherworldly hopes!  Once the sin against God was the greatest sin, but God died, and these 
sinners died with him.  To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful thing, and to esteem 
the entrails of the unknowable higher than the meaning of the earth.”20  The traditional Igbo 
would certainly not subscribe to the view that God is dead.   But at the same time, God is seen 
                                                          
18 For Stone what is unthinkable is when groups that were heretofore excluded, like women, Blacks, 
fetuses, Indians and those that belong to other family or kindred groups become included in the 
scheme of things.  He observed that it is now happening and therefore proposes that we should add to 
the list the objects in the environment:   “I am quite seriously proposing that we give legal rights to 
forests, oceans, rivers and other so called ‘natural objects’ in the environment as a whole” Stone, 
Christopher.  Should Trees have Standing?, p.6.  Stone’s advocacy of legal rights for the 
environment is based on a truncated morality as shall be shown in chapter four. 
19 Mwinzenge, Tembo S. “The concept of African Personality: Sociological Implications”, in 
    African Culture ( the rhythms of Unity). P.199. 
20 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra “Zarathustra’s Prologue” , § 3. 
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as living in heaven but also inhabiting the objects in the environment, like hills, forests, rivers, 
animals, etc.  And these are the objects he (the Igbo) deals directly with.  It is therefore 
necessary for him to live in harmony with these objects since they make up his only home.   
As an Igbo I find it quite difficult, reading from some authors—whose sources I 
sincerely question—that Africans have no respect for the environment.  J. Baird Callicot, for 
example, in his Earth’s Insights A Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterrean Basin to 
the Australian Outback, notes that African ecosophy has been neglected in the field of 
environmental ethics.21  The reason, according to Callicot, is to be found in the fact that 
Africans did not incorporate reverence and respect for the environment into their philosophy 
(culture) and religion.  What have been said about the Igbo attitude to the environment directly 
contradicts what Callicot has to say about the Africans’ environmental consciousness.  Despite 
all, Callicot is quite conscious of the African origin of Homo sapiens: 
Of course, all of us Homo Sapiens are Africans. Our Species is one among the indigenous 
charismatic mega fauna incubated in Africa.   We evolved shoulder to shoulder with our 
phylogenetic first cousins, the gorillas and chimpanzees.  After our African genesis, we 
gradually dispersed throughout the world.  Perhaps for those of us in the Diaspora the 
reverence for the wildlife of Africa is like reverence for the things of home.  It would be 
surprising to learn that our fellow Africans whose forebears remained at home during the 
past hundred thousand years did not share those feelings and incorporate them in their 
philosophies and religion.22
African religions and philosophy, as far as Callicot was concerned, are both 
monotheistic and anthropocentric.  The conclusion for him is obvious: What the African sees 
in the environment is nothing but mere human interest, and not even “enlightened rational self 
interest.”23 For the African, God has handed the world over to him for his own good.  The 
result is therefore a lacuna of environmentalism in Africa.  This is why Callicot asserts that 
“Apparently, therefore, Africa looms as a big blank spot on the world map of indigenous 
environmental ethics for a very good reason.  African thought orbits, seemingly, around, 
human interests.”24   
                                                          
21 Note that Calliccot is here speaking of Africa in a homogenous sense.  See Callicott, J. Baird. 
Earth’s Insights A Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterrean Basin to the Australian 
Outback, p. 156.  Henceforth, Earth’s Insights.   
22  Ibid, p. 156-157. 
23 Ibid, p. 158. 
24 Ibid, p. 158. 
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 Again, the account of Igbo (African) environmental consciousness I have given 
above starkly contradicts Callicott’s assertions.  As for the anthropocentric charge, we shall 
deal with that in subsequent chapters.  Suffice it here to say that what is important is not that 
human beings use other entities in the environment but rather how and why  those entities are 
used.  On the other side of the coin is how and why human beings are used by those other 
entities. Also, if by anthropocentrism he means that the African understands the environment 
as his servant, then that charge is more pervasive in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic dogma 
informed by Western dualism, as we shall see shortly. 
 That African cultures are imbued with belief in God is an indisputable fact.  
But this God is indeed a remote God and human beings interact with him only through deities 
like Ani.  An important dimension of this arrangement worth stressing here is that these deities 
have rules in the form of taboos.  These taboos help to inculcate respect and reverence for the 
environment and indeed impose legalistic obligations.25 In chapter four we shall look at the 
roles taboos have to play in the rights of the environment. 
 
I.3. HINDU AND BUDDHIST ATTITUDES TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
In some Eastern religions—Hinduism and Buddhism—one also finds a similar 
attitude to nature.  These religions see nature, including human beings, as one entity which 
should be treated with respect and reverence.  According to Dwivedi, “…in the ancient past, 
Hindus and Buddhists were careful to observe moral teachings regarding the treatment of 
nature.”26  Water, land, air, trees, and animals are revered and severe punishments are 
stipulated for those violating, as it were, the rights of these entities. As in traditional Igbo 
culture and religion, these rights are mostly religious.   Polluting the pathways (land) is an 
offence.  So is polluting water.  “God, Kesava, is pleased with a person who does not harm or 
destroy other non-speaking creatures or animals.  To not eat meat in Hinduism is considered 
both an appropriate conduct and a duty…The wicked person who kills animals which are 
protected has to live in hell-fire for the days equal to the number of hairs on the body of that 
                                                          
25 One finds a similar thought in Leopold’s “Land Ethic”, as we shall see later. 
26  Dwivedi, O.P. “Satyagraha for Conservation: Awakening the Spirit of Hinduism”, in Environmental 
Ethics, edited by Pojman Louis, p. 250. 
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animal.”27   This is because in the Hindu tradition there is an unshakable belief in re-
incarnation, where a person may come back as an animal or a bird, and this gives these entities 
not only respect, but also reverence.  Also, according to Dwivedi, “This provides a solid 
foundation for the doctrine of ahimsa—non-violence against animals and human beings 
alike.”28 Trees were also considered as capable of feeling happiness and sorrow.29  Dwivedi 
tells the story of how the Bishnois community in India, inspired by Guru Maharj Jambaji 
(1450CE), who was against killing animals or cutting down trees, lost three hundred and sixty-
three people in their bid to protect the environment.  This happened when a king from another 
part of India sent soldiers to cut down the trees that were in abundance in the Bishnois 
community in order to build his palace, the villagers came out and hugged the trees in order to 
prevent the soldiers from cutting them down.  After the soldiers killed 363 of them, the king 
ordered his soldiers to stop.30  The Bishnois continue to the present day in their defence of the 
environment and have inspired similar other endeavours like the Chipko Movement which 
emphasizes the proper management and use of trees in order to achieve sustainable 
development.31  According to George James, the Chipko movement was born in 1973 when  a 
group who sought permission from the forestry department to cut tress to make agricultural 
equipment was refused while another group that wanted the trees for making sporting 
equipment was granted permission.  The group at the receiving end of the injustice organized 
themselves to hug the trees, following the example of the earlier Bishnois community.  The 
Bishnois activism took place in 1731.32  Vandana Shiva points out that the Chipko movement 
is a relatively new phenomenon and was always led by anonymous women.  According to her, 
it is a “…movement whose activities in its two decades of evolution have been extended from 
embracing trees to embracing living mountains and living waters.  Each new phase of Chipko 
is created by invisible women.”33
 The Buddhist attitude towards the environment is also one marked by a sense of 
reverence.  The Buddhist strives to live harmoniously with nature.  As De Silva pointed out, 
                                                          
27 Ibid, p. 252. 
28 Ibid, p. 252. 
29  Ibid, p. 253. 
30 Ibid, p. 254. 
31 Ibid, p. 255. 
32 George,  J. James. “Ethical and religious dimension of the Chipko Movement”, in Hinduism and   
Ecology,p509. 
33 Shiva, Vanadana, “The Chipko women’s concept of  freedom” in Maria Mies & Vandana Shiva, 
Ecofeminism, pp. 146-150. 
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Buddhism advocates a gentle non-aggressive attitude towards nature.  “According to the 
Sigalovada Sutta  a householder should accumulate wealth as a bee collects pollen from a 
flower.  The bee harms neither the fragrance nor the beauty of the flower, but gathers pollen to 
turn it into sweet honey.  Similarly, man (sic) is expected to make legitimate use of nature”34  
The Buddha forbade the maltreatment of animals, even the least of them.  Man should avoid 
injuring—intentionally or unintentionally—all other creatures.  “… [T]he Buddha 
promulgated the rule against going on a journey during the rainy season because of possible 
injury to worms and insects that come to the surface in wet weather.  The same concern for 
non-violence prevents a monk from digging the ground.”35   
 As in the African setting, I do not want to create the impression that there are no 
abuses of the environment in these cultures and religions.  Indeed there is some ambiguity 
concerning the Buddha’s attitude to the killing of animals.  For instance, the Buddha expressly 
forbade monks from causing injury to animals and plants.  But because of the need for food 
production, lay Buddhists are allowed to plough the field for cultivation, an activity that 
inevitably leads to injury and death of worms and other small creatures.  This leaves the 
concept of ahimsa or non-injury, open to differing interpretations.  More so, as the Buddha 
lays emphasis only on the intentions of the one who does the inevitable injury?  Monks are 
also permitted to receive gifts of meat from the lay people whose intentions about the killing 
of the animals they ignore.36
 Similarly, in Hinduism, there is an ambiguity concerning purification or freeing 
oneself from the cycle of death and rebirth as it lays much emphasis on renunciation.  Some 
scholars see this as implying a neglect and devaluation of the natural universe.  According to 
Nelson, “In Advaita metaphysics, the world of nature—the suspect world of change and 
multiplicity—undergoes a wholesale objectification and radical ontological devaluation.  This 
process includes, of course, the human body and mind.  Advaita, betraying its legacy from the 
archaic Samkhya dualism, bases itself on a noetic discrimination…between Self and non-
Self…a sorting-out process that is at least provisionally dualistic.”37  This duality is brought 
out further in the analogy of the defective eye and bile.  “… persons with double vision may 
                                                          
34 De Silva, Lily. “The Buddhist Attitude Towards Nature”, in Ibid, p.258. 
35 Ibid, p. 258. 
36 Contemporary Buddhist Ethics, edited by Keown, Damien.  p. 115-117. 
37 Nelson, Lance E. “The dualism of nondualism: Advaita Vedanta and the irrelevance of Nature”, in 
Purifying the Earthly Body of God, religion and ecology in Hindu India, p.68. 
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continue to see two moons where, in fact, there is only one…The second moon does not 
disappear, despite knowledge of the true situation…even though knowing for certain that 
sugar is sweet, persons afflicted by a disorder of the bile continue to experience a bitter 
taste…”38 The liberated person—or saint—should equally know that the natural world is, like 
the content of dreams, false.   “The theme of perceiving the world as unreal is common in later 
texts.  The Pancadasi teaches that knowledge makes one conscious of the unreal nature… of 
the universe.  The liberated ascetic is conscious of the world’s falsity…”39
 George James argues, however, that if that is the case, Hinduism could not give rise 
to a movement such as the Chipko.  He concludes: “My conclusion is that Chipko is 
unquestionably a movement for the negation of the world.  The world it negates, however, is 
not the world of nature, which for the Chipko activists is sacred.  The world it negates is the 
world of scientific forestry and of politicians, technicians, and contractors within whose 
knowledge nature is reduced to a commodity in a system of economic exchange…”40   
 The point, of course, is that, admirable as it is, respect and reverence for nature in 
Hinduism is not a secular affair and cannot be binding on non-Hindus.  It is also grounded on 
an ambiguous metaphysical valuing of nature.  George James’ objection does not solve this 
problem.  This is because the negation of nature in Hinduism did not start with their encounter 
with the world of the scientific forestry, politicians and technicians and contractors.   These, 
one could argue, are later developments.  Hindu reaction to such developments, as exemplified 
in the Chipko movement, stems from their understanding of nature.  This understanding is 
essentially dualistic.  One could therefore say that this dualism is a major weakness of the 
Hindu system.  So, in as much as Hinduism approaches the environment with this dualistic 
view of nature, even if the dualism is only provisional, one can say that nature is thus 
devalued.  Nonetheless, one can still argue that the effect of this dualism is not completely 
negative as far as the environment is concerned.  This surely will need more research and 
studies to establish.  Unfortunately I cannot undertake such an enterprise in a work such as 
this. 
 
 
                                                          
38 Ibid, p. 74. 
39 Ibid, p. 75. 
40  George J. James, op cit, p. 526. 
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I.4. THE WESTERN (CHRISTIAN) ATTITUDE TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
 In the Judeo-Christian religions, the dualism that is inherent in the other religions 
already discussed is made more explicit by the Christian dogmatic attitude toward the 
environment.  That attitude is characterized by arrogance, anthropocentrism, and a 
domineering posture toward nature.  In the first book of the Bible (Genesis), it is stated that 
God created the heaven and the earth and all that is in it.  Then he created the first man, Adam, 
and then the first woman, Eve, as his companion.41  And he gave them authority to dominate, 
conquer, and overcome the earth and all that is in it.   As Genesis 1:28 states, “God blessed 
Adam and Eve, saying to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it.  Be 
masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of the heaven and all living animals on earth.’ 
 It was Lynn White who, in an article in the journal Science of March 1967, titled 
“The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis”, first drew attention to this Judeo-Christian 
attitude to nature as the root cause of the contemporary environmental crisis.  Many Christian 
apologists have reacted negatively to White’s claims. But the point, according to him, is that 
as Christianity became the dominant religion of the West, modern science which was also 
born in the West, took as its inspiration the Christian dogma of man’s dominion over the rest 
of nature.   
 White pointed out that in European antiquity, before Christianity became the 
dominant religion, there was a reverence for the environment.  “…every tree, every spring, 
every stream, every hill had its own genius loci, its guardian spirit.  These spirits were 
accessible to men, but were unlike men; centaurs, fauns, and mermaids show their 
ambivalence.  Before one cut a tree, mined a mountain, or dammed a brook, it was important 
to placate the spirit in charge of the particular situation, and to keep it placated.  By destroying 
the spirits in natural objects, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of 
indifference to the feelings of natural objects.”42
 Judeo-Christian apologists, it must be pointed out here, have consistently, at least 
since the publication of White’s paper, pointed out that their religion lays emphasis more on 
stewardship than on domination.  Callicot remarks that Genesis contains not one but two 
                                                          
41 Lynn White points out that Eve was created by God as an afterthought!  She was given to man to 
be his companion so that he would not be alone. 
42 White,  Lynn.  “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis”, in Environmental Ethics, edited by 
Pojman Louis, p. 17.  
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separate accounts of creation.  He argues that being made in the image of God confers, not just 
privileges, but equally responsibilities on human beings.  “Being created in the image of God 
confers, it might be argued, not only special rights and privileges on human beings but also 
special duties and responsibilities.  Paramount among these responsibilities, it might be 
supposed, is man’s duty wisely and benignly to rule his dominion, the earth.  To abuse, 
degrade, or destroy the earth is to violate the trust that the regent (God) placed in His viceroy 
(man).”43  Callicott notes that biblical scholars distinguish two creation myths in the book of 
Genesis.  These are labeled as P and J, where P stands for the priestly narrative and J for the 
Yhawist narrative.  J is said to be at least half a millennium older than P and begins in Genesis 
2:4 with the creation of man, plants and animals, etc, and finally woman.  P, which is the more 
popular account, begins with the creation of light, separation of water and land, other 
creatures, and finally with what Callicott describes as the amorphous “man” on the sixth and 
last day. 
 In J, man is made from the earth as were the other animals.  It is in this narrative 
that the significance of the first man’s name—Adam, from adama or the earth—is brought to 
bear on his essential identity with the earth.  As Callicott comments, “The first man’s very 
name thus associates him with the most material element—with the soil, with nature, and not, 
as the later imago dei suggests, with the heavens, the ethereal, and the divine.”44  The 
implications of the J narrative are firstly, that the biblical account of creation cannot be said to 
be only anthropocentric as in P but equally ecocentric.  Secondly, it could be safely assumed 
that God wanted the human being to live in harmony with the rest of nature as one among its 
creatures.  And this was why God later bitterly regretted making man after the Fall.45  Thirdly, 
since J predates P—on which the stewardship and anthropocentric interpretations are based, 
one can also safely assume that that was what God intended from the beginning.  Man finally 
deviated from this divine project.  Or, taking both accounts as pure myths as told by humans, 
one can assume that P represents a shift in the environmental consciousness of the narrators. 
This is because God, being omniscient and omnipotent as alleged, could have foreseen that 
one of his creatures—a human—was going to upset the balance of harmony that he has 
                                                          
43 Callicott,  Baird J. Earth’s Insights, p. 16. 
44 Ibid, p.17. 
45 “And it repented the Lord that he had made man on earth, and it grieved Him at His heart…” 
Genesis 2:6. 
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created.  So, if things were really under his control, he could have made everything from the 
beginning in such a way that all the creatures will live in harmony, giving them only such 
powers as to enable them achieve that harmony. 
 In any case, J is quite environmentally friendly.  However, I can think of only one 
known authority in the Judeo-Christian tradition that took it to heart.  That person was 
St.Francis of Assisi who took all natural entities to be equal as creatures of the same God.  But 
what Francis did was so unorthodox that White thought that the real miracle of Francis was 
that he did not end up on the stakes as many of his followers did.46 Despite Francis’ efforts, it 
is the P narrative that has taken root in the Judeo-Christian dogma.  Unfortunately, what the 
stewardship interpretation, which is based on P does, is not just show that we are different 
from other entities in nature, like the animals from plants—a difference of degree— but that 
we are essentially different from nature.  It also makes us believe, falsely, that we can really 
determine the course of the environment.  We certainly do affect the environment, but the 
ultimate course and fate of the environment do not depend on us. 
 It is, I suppose, with Francis in mind that White was therefore very careful to 
distinguish Christianity47 from Christian doctrine and dogma.  Nash has also remarked that 
“As a scholar concerned with the history of ideas, White knew the relevant question was not, 
what does Christianity mean? but what did it mean to a particular society at a given time and 
place?  His approach, in other words, was pragmatic: How was the Judeo-Christian tradition 
used?”48   As White points out, there is no doubt that modern science and technology draw 
their inspiration from the Christian dogma of human’s dominance over nature.  But he 
contrasts the attitudes of Eastern and Western Christians towards nature.  According to him, 
the Eastern attitude was marked by intellectualism or clear thinking—orthodoxy—while the 
Western attitude was more voluntarist.  For the East, sin was intellectual blindness while for 
the West, sin was moral evil.  Conversely, “the Greek saint contem plates while the Western 
saint acts.  The implications of Christianity for the conquest of nature would emerge more 
easily in the Western atmosphere.”49  The Eastern Christians saw the objects in nature, like 
ants and fire, as symbols of God’s communication to man. As Hu Shih has pointed out, “The 
                                                          
46  White, Lynn.  op cit, p. 18. 
47 This distinction is similar to that of Kierkegaard who distinguished Christianity from Christendom. 
48 Nash, Roderick Frazier. The Rights of Nature, p. 89. 
49  White, Lynn.  op.cit., p.17. 
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most outstanding characteristic of Eastern civilization is to know contentment, whereas that of 
the West is not to know contentment.  Contented Easterners are satisfied with their simple life 
and therefore do not seek to increase their material enjoyment…They …do not want to 
conquer nature but merely to be at home with nature and at peace with their lot.” 50    Shih is 
here talking of the Chinese tradition.  But what he says generally holds true also of what has 
been said here about the East in general. The Eastern attitude to nature could be better 
understood by this saying: “Sitting quietly doing no-thing, spring comes and the grass 
grows.”51 In other words, the Easterner “acts through non-acting”.   On the contrary, in the 
West, scientists (Christians and non-believers) use the objects in nature to understand the mind 
of God and how creation operates.52   They scrutinize nature, hoping to lay bare its secrets.  In 
contemporary physics, such an attitude leads to the endeavour to discover a complete or 
unified theory so that we can explain away, as opposed to describing, nature as a whole.  
According to Stephen Hawking, “…if we discover a complete theory, it should in time be 
understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists.  Then we shall all, 
philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the discussion of the 
question of why it is that we and the universe exist.  If we find the answer to that, it would be 
the ultimate triumph of human reason—for then we would know the mind of God.”53   
 White contrasts the above attitude with that of St. Francis, a thoroughgoing 
Christian.  Francis, writes White, “tried to depose man from his monarchy over creation and 
set up a democracy of all God’s creatures.  With him the ant is no longer simply a homily for 
the lazy, flames a sign of the thrust of the soul toward union with God; now they are Brother 
ant and Sister fire, praising the Creator in their own ways as Brother Man does in his.”54  This, 
of course, means seeing a sort of divine presence in all the objects of nature.  It’s not new with 
Francis.  The great religions we have spoken of above all have similar attitudes towards 
nature. 
We can now see why these practices constitute an obstacle to the respect for the 
entities in the environment if we keep in mind that religious precepts are binding only on those 
                                                          
50 Hu, Shih. Sources of Chinese Tradition, in Bartlett, p. 1019. 
51  De Mello, Anthony. One Minute Wisdom, p. 94. 
52 White, Lynn.  op.cit., p. 17. 
53 Hawking , Stephen.  A Brief History of Time, p. 175.  
54 White, Lynn. op.cit., p.18. 
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who subscribe to the religion in question.  In other words, these cultures placed the imperative 
of the respect for nature somehow above the environment itself and posited it in a supernatural 
being or, as is the case in Hinduism, in the law of karma which ensures the re-incarnation of 
human beings and moral requital.  In the final analysis, the biological and ecological inter-
relationship between the human being and these other entities are drowned out by an approach 
that bestows some rather mystical qualities, as prescribed by each religious culture, on these 
entities.  The respect for the environment, so fostered, remains without an earthly foundation.  
And consequently, such respect cannot be authentic firstly because it is not based on reality as 
we see it and secondly because it is based on faith which holds only for those who subscribe to 
the faith in question.  This is why taboos can no longer be used to enforce respect for the 
environment.  If the authors of the taboos had taken time to explain the interconnectedness 
between the human beings who were being asked to observe them and the rest of the 
environment, the observers of the taboos might have seen its logical and practical necessity, 
even if they do not agree wholly with them.  Again, since the imperative for the respect of the 
environment was more religious than legal and since religious faith is basically a private 
affair, its enforcement was intractable.  For instance, when the Christian missionaries first 
came to Igbo land, they were given forests that have been reserved exclusively for the gods 
and into which no one entered for fear of the gods.  The missionaries, having no notion of 
those gods or their wrath, promptly constructed their churches in those hitherto dreaded 
places.  The natives were certain that the missionaries would not last more than a couple of 
months as the gods would surely visit their wrath on them.  The missionaries stayed and grew 
stronger.  This led many Igbos to begin to question their faith in the gods of their ancestors.  
The result is that today there are many Igbo Christians who have totally abandoned the 
religions of their forebears and with that abandonment came less and less respect for the 
environment to the point that it is now reaching ecological crisis.  So, whereby in a religious 
injunction, the gods are awaited to punish the offenders, in legal injunctions the offenders are 
punished by other human beings.  This is more expedient.  What is more, it shows that the 
respect for the environment is not a “heavenly” but a worldly affair through and through. 
Christianity certainly influenced the promulgation of Roman Law which the West 
pervasively adopted into their legal codes.  But these laws have weaknesses that could be 
traced to their religious root: God above man, man above woman and all above nature.  Today, 
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even though these laws have become secular, they still bear the marks of their religious 
foundation.  The Islamic legal code, or the sharia, is following hard on the same route traveled 
by the Christian legal code or canon law.  In the sharia, for instance, a man is entitled to as 
many as four wives.  Women are to marry as early as possible and are explicitly forbidden 
from engaging in certain professions and in some cases, from working outside their homes. 
My argument, therefore, as I will pursue further in chapter four, is that respect for the 
environment should be based on legal injunctions which in turn should be based on the 
ontological independence and the intrinsic aesthetic value of the environment.  The cultures 
and religions discussed here do not see the environment as being ontologically independent as 
regards its origin.  They do not see it, also, as aesthetically independent.  The picture of the 
environment that comes across from their theories is that the entities in her bosom are seen 
basically as mere appearances of the real which is other-worldly.  On this point then, the ethics 
or laws based on such theories are deficient.  The following chapter will therefore address the 
ontological independence of the environment to show that respect for the environment should 
not be based on any supposed being that is outside the sensible sphere. 
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                                          CHAPTER TWO 
THE ONTOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
 “We are the land and the 
 land is us”55
 —Fabienne Boyet 
 
“…to the Ogoni, the land and the   
people are one and are expressed as 
such in our local languages.”56
 —Ken Saro-Wiwa 
 
The first chapter looked at the problem of how some cultures and religions see the 
environment.  That problem is basically that of how the environment is conceived by these 
cultures and religions and how those concepts have influenced their ethics of the environment.  
They see the environment only as what human beings say it is.  It is a problem of idealism that 
gives the prerogative of deciding what the environment is and why it exists to human 
concepts.  The problem stems from a failure to see the environment as an independent being in 
its own right.   In this chapter, I want to show how the environment is not ontologically 
dependent on the human being.  I begin with a (working) definition of the environment. 
 
I. WHAT IS THE ENVIRONMENT? 
By environment I mean anything in nature that is not created.  And by creation I mean 
willfully bringing something into existence.  Not being created does not mean that the 
environment is causa sui.  Rather, it means that its origin is to be found in accidental natural 
processes that are purposeless.  The environment in this sense differs from the ecosystem in as 
much as the latter includes artifacts made for different purposes by animals, including humans. 
 
II. BEING NATURAL, ARTIFICIAL, OR ACCIDENTAL 
The word “willfully” as being used here cannot be over-emphasized.  I want to 
examine it by discussing what is natural, artificial, and accidental.  Something which is 
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willfully brought into existence is fundamentally different from another which is natural.  
Something is natural when it is not purposely brought into being by something outside of 
itself.  A river is natural while something like an anthill is not.  The anthill is constructed by 
ants, as birds construct nests, and human beings construct houses, to serve whatever purpose 
they want those artifacts to serve.  The materials used in such constructions or organizations 
may be natural—like water, grass, sand, leaves, stones, clay, etc.  But the finished products are 
artifacts.  Eric Katz argues that even when the objects so constructed remain in a quasi-natural 
state, they are still artificial or artifacts.  In an essay titled “The Big Lie”, he declares that “The 
natural environment cannot be redesigned or restored and remain natural.”57 This declaration 
was made in the context of his criticism of the proponents of the “restoration thesis”.  This is 
where a natural entity like river, landscape, hill, mountain, etc, that had been damaged could 
be restored to its “original” state.58 According to Katz, this is simply artificial. “Depending on 
the adequacy of our technology, these restored and redesigned natural areas will appear more 
or less natural, but they will never be natural—they will be anthropocentrically designed 
human artifacts.59  The point Katz is making is that there is a clear ontological difference 
between what is natural and what is made to look natural.  In the same vein, Allen Carlson 
calls nature “not our own creation.”60
It follows then that the environment, at least as I am using it here, is what is natural 
and uncreated.  It is what is and not what is made to be.  Artifacts like anthills, birds’ nests, 
etc, are created. They may not be created by reflective beings—if we grant that only human 
beings are capable of reflection—but they are made for a purpose, just as humans construct 
houses.  Where it may be possible for us, as humans, to create nests or anthills, we cannot 
create the bird or the ant.  We can only aid in their reproduction, using what is already there, 
that is, genes that have evolved naturally. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 Katz, Eric. op.cit., p. 97. 
58 Katz, Eric. op.cit., p. 97. 
59 59 Katz, Eric. op.cit., p. 97. 
60  Allen, Carlson. “Appreciating Nature” in Arguing about art, p. 163. 
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II.1. ACCIDENTAL CREATIONS AND REPRODUCTION 
One also needs to distinguish what comes into being from an accidental combination 
of other natural objects and one that is willfully brought into being.  What underscores this 
difference is purpose and purposelessness. Natural objects exist for no particular purpose 
whatsoever.  For instance, the existence of hydrogen and oxygen in the environment is simply 
purposeless.  So is the accidental combination of the two that results in water.  The product of 
this combination—water—is as natural as its components.  Now the same thing cannot be said 
of the manipulation or production of these entities in the laboratory for scientific, 
technological, medical and other purposes.  For the finished product to be natural, the 
combination has to be purely accidental.  In the same vein, the stone which exists not because 
it is willfully made by anything and therefore is purposeless is natural while the anthill is not.  
When the stone is carved into something like a statue, it becomes artificial as Katz pointed out.  
In that case it can only be said to be quasi natural. 
Reproduction also falls into this category.  When two animals mate or when a plant 
through different natural mechanisms reproduces, the product is natural.  This contrasts with 
the artificial reproductions of animals and plants by humans.  The products of such artificial 
reproductions are engineered towards some purpose in the mind of the engineer.  Without this 
purpose the object will be not be created in the first place.  If one accepts that everything that 
is natural is ipso facto purposeless, then it becomes less difficult to determine what is natural 
and what is artificial.  Katz puts purpose and function together in differentiating between what 
is natural and what is artificial.  To say that something has a purpose would mean, for him, to 
say that it has intrinsic function for which it was designed.  The understanding is therefore that 
natural entities do not have any set or intrinsic purpose.  So he says that “Natural objects lack 
the kind of purpose and function found in artifacts…natural entities have no intrinsic 
function…they were not created for a particular purpose; they have no set manner of use. 
Although we often speak as if natural individuals (for example, predators) have roles to play in 
ecosystemic well-being (the maintenance of optimum population levels), this kind of talk is 
either metaphorical or fallacious.  No one created or designed the mountain lion as regulator of 
the deer population.”61   
                                                          
61  Katz, Eric. op.cit., p. 98. 
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The evidence we have from evolution shows that the environment evolved in a 
purposeless manner.  It is therefore without purpose and purely accidental.  The dissection or 
analysis of any object in nature shows that it is an accidental combination of other objects in 
nature.  Water, for instance, is an accidental combination of hydrogen and oxygen.  The 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms have the kind of properties that make it possible for them to 
combine and form water.  But this combination is still accidental in that those atoms were not 
purposely produced by anyone to eventually combine to become water.  The evolution of life 
itself also resulted from a series of accidental combinations.  This suggests that life has no 
inherent purpose.  As Nietzsche pointed out, against Hegel who said that there is a final aim to 
world history, “That my life has no aim is evident even from the accidental nature of its origin; 
that I can posit an aim for myself is another matter.”62    
Spinoza makes a similar point in his discussion of perfection and imperfection.   
According to him, when one sets out to construct something and finishes it, she calls it perfect.  
Others who know what she set out to do will also call it perfect.  From this knowledge, 
according to Spinoza, we form general notions of perfection and imperfection.  We do this, 
despite the fact that we may not know precisely what is in the mind of the one who sets out to 
construct the artifact.  Thanks to these general notions we can say whether what she has 
constructed is perfect or not.  This, according to him, is why we can talk of a perfect or an 
imperfect house, for example.63 Now when we transpose this knowledge of artifacts to nature, 
a difficulty arises.  This is because our notions of what is perfect or imperfect as they concern 
artifacts cannot be applied to natural entities.  The reason for this is that nature has no purpose 
or end as such, the way a house does.  Because of this, we cannot say nature is perfect or 
imperfect for we cannot know it the way we can know whether a house is perfect or not.  
Spinoza therefore makes the case for the purposelessness of nature: “We thus see that men 
(sic) have been wont to call things of nature perfect or imperfect from prejudice rather than 
from a true knowledge…nature does not act with an end in view: for that eternal and infinite 
being we call God or nature acts by the same necessity as that by which it exists…Therefore 
the reason or cause why God or nature acts or why they exist, is one and the same; therefore, 
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 26
as God exists with no end in view, he cannot act with any end in view, but has no beginning or 
end either in existing or acting” 64
The beginning of the universe itself is also accidental.  Our universe was said to have 
been contained in a “cosmic atom” of infinite density which then exploded billions of years 
ago in what is believed to be the beginning of time.  According to Verril, “…all the matter of 
the known universe was bunched in space—a literal chaos, or giant “cosmic atom”, in the 
beginning—and exploded about three billion years ago to start the cycle of cosmic events in 
which we find ourselves.  Large blobs from this explosion, like the sun, have been able to 
maintain themselves as durable atomic furnaces.  Smaller knots, like the Earth and other 
planets, cooled quickly to liquid spheres.”65 Many accounts of the beginning of the universe 
reflect this theory.  They are attempts by human beings to describe the origin of things they 
see around them.  Some of these theories are today supported by scientific findings. The 
evidence of the big bang is to be found in the fact that the universe is constantly expanding, 
“…as though all is space and matter has been flung apart by some explosion.  The echoes of 
the energy from the Big Bang still exist in space.”66 Despite this type of evidence, the question 
of whether the universe has a beginning or not is not yet a settled matter.  Indeed, Immanuel 
Kant calls such problems antinomies—or contradictions—of pure reason.  This is because 
Kant thought that there are equally sound and compelling arguments for believing both the 
thesis and the anti-thesis.67
When we come to the beginning of life, however, its origin is less contested in the 
scientific world.  And just like the beginning of the universe and our planets, the beginning of 
life is purely accidental as its evolutionary account makes clear.  What the earth possessed 
billions of years ago were molecules or compounds such as water vapour, carbon dioxide, 
methane, and ammonia.  These compounds, under the influence of ultra violet radiation, 
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formed more complex molecules, notably amino acids—the building blocks of proteins.  This 
process continued and led, accidentally, to the appearance of simple life forms on earth that 
used anaerobic process to get their energy.  This is a process that does not require oxygen.  
This was because at the time there was virtually no oxygen on our planet. 
Then, about three billion years ago, photosynthetic entities began to evolve.  
Photosynthesis is a complex process whereby organisms that have chloroplasts and 
chlorophyll produce carbohydrates using water and carbon dioxide and then releasing free 
oxygen in the process.  The oxygen released by photosynthesis—as a by product—is highly 
toxic to anaerobic organisms.  This eventually led to the evolution of aerobic organisms which 
use oxygen for respiration.   
The accumulation of oxygen in the atmosphere also led to the formation of the ozone 
layer.  It is the formation of the ozone layer, which “…protected the surface of the planet from 
the high energy ultra-violet light from the sun, which allowed more complex and delicate life-
forms (like us) to evolve.”68  We therefore owe our existence to this layer, as Grum et al point 
out; “Virtually all the earth’s organisms owe their lives to the filtering effects of the ozone 
layer 20 to 50 kilometers (12 to 30 miles) above.  About 99 percent of the sun’s lethal 
ultraviolet rays are absorbed by this invisible layer; as a result, organisms are spared over 
exposure to these killer rays that destroy many biological molecules, including DNA.”69
What I have been trying to point out from the above discussion is that, as far as the 
universe goes, it is not created in the sense of having an organism or a supernatural being 
designing and determining what it should be and then fashioning it out accordingly.  This 
helps to show that the universe and all that is in it, naturally that is, is purposeless. “Let us”, 
says Nietzsche, “beware of believing the universe is a machine; it is certainly not constructed 
so as to perform some operation…Let us beware of saying there are laws in nature.  There are 
only necessities: there is no one to command, no one to obey, no one to transgress.”70  What is 
artificial, like the anthill, is made for a purpose by an organism, while what is natural is its 
exact opposite.  
Is everything that is produced accidentally therefore natural?  One can say that there 
can be accidental creations of unnatural things.  Such accidental productions usually occur 
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while one is engaged in producing something else and the accidental production becomes an 
accidental by-product of such endeavour.  The accidental production that takes place in nature 
is different from artificial production, even if such production is accidental.  The difference 
between what is naturally accidental and what is artificially accidental is that the former needs 
no agent to consciously trigger it off while the latter does.  Purely accidental, and therefore 
natural, productions do not need any conscious agents to initiate them.  This is why they are 
described as natural.  And whatever results from such productions, be it major or by-products, 
like in photosynthesis, are natural products.  Major and by-products are simply our ways of 
describing what has taken place. 
 
II.2. CREATION EX NIHILO 
Here I want to briefly discuss the theory of creation ex nihilo to try to clarify the point 
I am making about the purposelessness of the environment.   
Most religions have an account of the creation of the world.  Usually, it is a supreme 
and omnipotent being who brings things into existence through omnipotence.  This is known 
as creation ex nihilo.  In the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition, the account of creation is quite 
detailed; so much so that the first human being created is said to be named and known together 
with the time of his creation and the number of days it took the creator to do the work of 
creation, etc.  This account is quite clear in the book of Genesis.  From this account, it is clear 
that God made everything in the world from nothing—ex nihilo—and then gave them to 
humans to direct.  This narrative, if believed, pre-empts any inquiry into the origin of the 
universe.  We find a similar account in the Igbo traditional religion.  “It says that Chukwu (or 
Chinieke71)—The Supreme Deity—created the universe—the sky (eluigwe) and the earth (elu 
uwa), spirits, man, animals and everything in it…The first man created was called Ifenta 
(Junior light).”72  God is symbolized by the sun.  The account postulates that God gave 
everything to the first man and woman for their own good.  So, for the average Igbo, all that is 
in the world was made by God, who is spirit and head of the unseen world.  That explains, in a 
nutshell, the origin of the world.  According to Edeh, “Origins are always traced back to the 
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land of the unseen.  Hence, visible objects are to be understood as gifts from the head of the 
inhabitants of the unseen.”73  Nietzsche refers to this as the myth of deed and doer.  “…There 
is no “being” behind the doing, acting, becoming; the “doer” has simply been added to the 
deed by the imagination—the doing is everything.”74  Sartre’s comment on this point is 
apposite: “…if we once get away from what Nietzsche called ‘the illusion of worlds-behind-
the-scene’ and if we no longer believe in the being-behind-the-appearance, then the 
appearance becomes full positivity…”75 For these religions, namely Igbo traditional religion, 
Judeo-Christianity, and Islam, every deed must have a doer.  The big bang is seen in this light 
as the moment God created the world.  According to Stephen Hawking, the Catholic Church 
has seized the Big Bang theory as being in accord with Scripture.  Hawking gives his account 
thus: “…in 1981, my interest in questions about the origin and fate of the universe was 
reawakened when I attended a conference on cosmology organized by the Jesuits in the 
Vatican…At the end of the conference the participants were granted an audience with the 
pope.  He told us it was alright to study the evolution of the universe after the big bang, but we 
should not inquire into the big bang itself because that was the moment of Creation and 
therefore the work of God.”76 Callicott seems to be thinking in the same way when he said that 
“…current cosmology posits a beginning of the universe in time.  Beyond the Big Bang 
science cannot see, and scientific Christians are free to believe that God directly created the 
enormous energy that coalesced into spatio-temporal-material universe that is the object of 
scientific investigation.”77
Hinduism, Buddhism, and most Eastern religions are rather silent about the origin of 
the world.  What one finds in their natural philosophy is a continuity of being which is akin to 
saying that the universe has existed eternally in a self-generating manner.  According to de 
Silva, “The Buddha was silent on questions like the origin of the world or what happens to the 
enlightened one after death.  He said that those questions had no categorical answer.”78 This 
reminds one of Kant saying that such problems are antinomies of pure reason! 
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In Platonism, one finds a tacit approval that the universe has existed for ever.  
Apparently, Plato did not believe in the anthropomorphic polytheism of the Athenian religion 
of his time.  The Demiurge or world maker, who dwells in the pure world of Forms, did not 
make the world out of nothing.  Rather, he fashions or creates the world out of a pre-existing 
chaos of matter into patterns taken from the world of Forms. 
If the universe is seen as something that is brought into being ex-nihilo by a supreme 
being, then it would follow that one cannot successfully argue that it has an independent 
origin.  The question then is, does the universe exist because God brought it into being or did 
God bring it into being because it exists?  To put it in another way, was it God who said that 
he brought the universe into being or human beings who say that?  It appears that some human 
beings first see that they and the universe exist and then postulate that it is God who must have 
brought it into being.  According to Anthony de Mello when we talk of God, we are actually 
talking of our own concepts and not an independent reality.  “It is not true to say that God 
created the world, or God loves us or God is great…in the interest of accuracy one should say: 
Our God-concept created the world, Our God-concept loves us, Our God-concept is great.”79 
John Muir captures this attitude well enough: “They have precise and dogmatic insight into the 
intentions of the Creator…He is regarded as a civilized, law-abiding gentleman…and is as 
purely a manufactured article as any puppet of a half penny theatre.  With such views of the 
Creator it is, of course, not surprising that erroneous views should be entertained of the 
creation.  To such properly trimmed people, the sheep, for example, is an easy problem—food 
and clothing ‘for us’…”80
What is said about the theory of creation ex-nihilo could well be said about the theory 
of evolution and the big bang, though to a much lesser degree.  It is the human being trying to 
make sense of (the origin of) things around her.  The crucial difference is that in the latter 
theories, nothing supra-sensible is invoked as the ultimate explanation.  And scientific 
evidence points to the validity of the latter theories.  The silence of the Eastern religions on 
this issue seems quite plausible.  That silence is the endorsement of the theory of the 
everlasting continuity of being.  It has crucial implications in the argument for the intrinsic 
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value of the environment.  In other words, if nature is not consciously brought about by 
anything outside of itself, but is as a result of accidental natural processes, then it would be 
plausible to argue for its intrinsic value especially from the point of view of purpose.  This 
would show that the environment is not created for any purpose whatsoever that could be 
attributed to its creator.  The value it has would therefore be inherent in itself and not one that 
would serve any pre-established purpose. 
 
IV. ONTOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE 
Earlier on, the environment was defined, rather briefly, as anything that is not created.  
And creation was in turn defined as bringing something willfully into existence.  Something 
which is willfully brought into existence must have a purpose.  This does not rule out the fact 
that it may serve an entirely different end than that to which it was originally destined.  But 
what basically differentiates what is natural from creations or artifacts is that the former is 
absolutely purposeless.  Here I want to argue that what confers on the environment its 
ontological independence is this purposelessness. 
The environment as presented here is what has evolved accidentally and 
independently of any conscious agent.  The ontological status of water, for instance, is 
different from that of this paper.  The ontological status of the bird is equally radically 
different from that of its nest.  So, while the bird and the water are ontologically independent 
by reason of their provenance, the paper and nest are not.  The beings of the nest and the paper 
depend on those who made them for their own purposes.   
To what, then, does the environment owe its being?  If we take the Big Bang and 
evolution seriously, which is the position here, then the answer is that it owes its being to 
nothing external to itself.  Entities in the environment combine in purely accidental manners, 
to form other entities.  The evolution of life, to which we owe our being, is such an accident.  
First anaerobic entities evolved with the capacity to get their energy or sustenance without 
oxygen.  Then photosynthesis which eventually, through nature’s painfully slow process, 
produced the oxygen that led to the formation of the ozone layer which made it possible for 
complex life forms, like ours, to evolve.  It needs to be pointed out too that in the process, 
most anaerobic entities were destroyed by the oxygen that is highly toxic.  This shows that 
nature produces and destroys at the same time, following its own rhythm.  Heraclitus calls it 
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exchange. “To say that everything is in flux meant for Heraclitus that the world is an ‘ever-
living Fire’ whose constant movement is assured by ‘measures of it kindling and measures 
going out!...all things are an exchange for Fire and Fire for all things, even as ware for gold, 
gold for wares.”81
The theories of the Big Bang and evolution are ways we try to make sense of the 
origin of the environment.  Some people prefer to say that the origin of life, for example, is a 
mysterious process.82 It is called mysterious simply because of our inability to explain it away.  
Sartre says that being is simply de trop because there is no reason why there should not have 
been no being at all.  “Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible.  It is…Uncreated, 
without reason for being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is de trop 
for eternity.”83 The fact that the environment has no reason for its existence to me, is an 
indication of its ontological independence.  This contrasts to the way we easily explain the 
reason for the existence of artifacts.  When objects that could be millions of years old are 
usually excavated by archeologists, their origins are always explained by the purpose they 
might have served its fabricators.  For instance, the recent discovery of burnt bones by 
scientists in South Africa led them to conclude that our recent ancestors used fire about 1.5 
million years ago.84
As it is difficult to know what the exact beginning of the environment is, so is it also 
difficult to know what the end might be or all the processes the environment will go through.  
The environment is always evolving, so that what it was and what it is are not exactly the 
same. Heraclitus said in one of his Fragments that nature loves to hide!  This cannot be said of 
artifacts which are fixated, bearing the marks their makers want them to bear.  But because the 
environment is in perpetual flux, no one entity or group of entities can determine what the 
others should be.  As I pointed out earlier, some physicists think we should now be talking of 
multi-verse instead of universe as they are beginning to get evidence that there may be more 
than one universe.  Our planet is today not what it was some thousands of years ago.  As 
Lewontin points out, “Only 60,000 years ago, Canada was completely under ice as was the 
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middle of the United States.”85 No other entity in the environment, including human beings, 
can ultimately stop the environment from evolving the way it evolves.  As human beings we 
sometimes like to think of ourselves as different or above this self-propelled movement of the 
environment or the ecosystem.  But we simply are not.  From our evolution and possibly to 
our extinction, we are an intrinsic part of the purposelessness of the processes of the 
ecosystem.  These processes do not depend on us but rather we, ultimately, depend on them.  
If there are no plants to produce oxygen all the animals, including human beings will simply 
suffocate.  At the same time, we cannot stop ourselves from affecting the lives of plants, and 
indirectly, the lives of other animals.  As Lewontin puts it, “Every breath you take removes 
oxygen and adds carbon dioxide to the world.  Mort Sahl once said, ‘Remember, no matter 
how cruel and nasty and evil you may be, every time you take a breath you make a flower 
happy.’”86   
Taken as a whole, then, the environment and all that evolve in it depend on nothing 
outside of itself for its being.  We human beings are part of this environment and necessarily 
take part, as every other entity does, in its evolutionary processes.  We cannot say with 
absolute certainty how much longer this process this can go on or the directions it will be 
taking.  This is simply because the environment is ontologically independent.  The fact that 
we, like other animals, could destroy entities in the environment does not mean that the 
environment depends on us.  The fact that the lion could eat up a human being does not mean 
the human being depends on the lion for its existence.  Also, the fact that we take in oxygen 
and destroy it by transforming it into carbon dioxide does not mean that oxygen depends on us 
for its being.  Destruction of entities in the environment by other entities does not have a 
bearing on the ontological independence of the entity being destroyed.  This is simply because 
the entity being destroyed was not brought about in the first place by the entity doing the 
destruction.  If the sun burns out the earth, for instance, that would not mean that the earth was 
created by the sun.  If a river overflows, for instance, and destroys plants, animals, landscapes, 
etc, that would not mean that the river was their creator.  Conversely, if the soil supports plant 
life, it could not be said to be its creator.  Water cannot be said to be the creator of the entities 
that could not exist without it. 
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The picture of the environment thus created gives credence to Heraclitus’ idea that the 
environment is in perpetual flux.  But it is very important to point out that Heraclitus was 
speaking only of natural entities that are ontologically independent.  It is even more interesting 
to note that Heraclitus hinges this perpetual flux, this continuous change, on fire.  Fire meant 
for him a transforming agent or a current of energy through which the world is made dynamic.  
This current of energy perpetually flows from the sun, thereby keeping the solar system in 
perpetual flux as measures of it kindle and measures go out.  
What this chapter aimed to establish is that the environment exists in an independent 
manner.  That is, that it was not willfully brought into being by a conscious agent.  Entities 
that make up the environment can manipulate, exploit, and use other entities to produce things.  
But the things so produced are artifacts, invariably meant to serve one purpose or the other.  A 
bird, for instance, can take credit for the existence of her nest.  But she cannot be credited with 
the existence of the grass it used to construct the nest.  In a way, the bird can be said to depend 
on the grass for materials to construct her nest.  The grass itself in turn depends on other 
entities for its existence.  Animals also depend on organic and inorganic entities for their 
existence.  But this interdependence does not mean ontological dependence in the sense that 
none of these consciously or purposely brought the others into existence.  This is the way the 
ontological independence of the environment has been presented in this chapter. In the next 
chapter, I want to explore the implications of this ontological independence of the 
environment to make a case for its intrinsic value.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
“Shall I not have intelligence with the earth?   
Am I not partly leaves and vegetable mould   
myself? 
  —Thoreau Henry D.87
 
What kind of value does the environment as presented here have?  From what has 
been said so far, the environment has been shown to have ontological independence.  But does 
it by virtue of that have intrinsic value?  My answer is in the affirmative.  But before I give the 
reasons for my position, a few preliminary remarks are in order. What, in fact, is value itself?  
Value denotes worth or what a thing is worth.   And this worth is usually taken as a synonym 
for good.  This is why we sometimes talk of something as either having value of some sort or 
being valueless.  For instance, something can have commercial value or be commercially 
valueless.  In this chapter I want to argue for nature’s intrinsic value, opposing it to 
instrumental value and arguing that an entity need not be a moral agent to have intrinsic value.   
Instrumental or extrinsic value is the value an object has by virtue of the purpose it 
serves.  An instrument is what is made to achieve certain aims.  All artifacts fall under this 
category.  The moral value of non-human natural entities (and artifacts) is not based on moral 
agency.  They have moral value in the sense of being moral patients, or, as I will show later, 
being morally considerable.  It is only in this sense that we can talk, for instance, of a forest 
being abused.  This cannot be the same as the moral value that humans, endowed with moral 
capacities like self-consciousness and autonomous choices, have as moral agents. As moral 
agents, our actions are either moral or immoral. So, our treatment of non-human entities can 
also be said to be moral or immoral. But the intrinsic value of non-human entities is not moral 
the way that of humans are.  In order words, an entity does not have be a moral agent to have 
intrinsic value.  This is the case of non-human natural entities, including humans who may not 
be said to be fully human.  
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What is intrinsic value and how do natural entities possess it?  I start by contrasting 
intrinsic value to instrumental or extrinsic value.  Where intrinsic or inherent value is the value 
that a thing has in itself, extrinsic value is the value that accrues to it from outside of itself.  
G.E. Moore’s definition of intrinsic value is apt, even though his target is quite different from 
that of this project.  “For Moore”, comments Agar, “whether or not an object possesses 
intrinsic value is a matter of its intrinsic nature.  The intrinsic nature of an object is, in turn, 
constituted by its non-relational properties, properties that are possessed regardless of 
context.”88 Moore therefore defines intrinsic value thus: “To say that a kind of value is 
‘intrinsic’ means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it 
possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.”89 What is the 
intrinsic nature of the environment?  I think that the nature in question is based on its origin 
which I have argued is both accidental and purposeless.  Humans and other natural entities 
have the same intrinsic nature.  The intrinsic nature that humans share with other natural 
entities is our common origin which is both accidental and purposeless.  That intrinsic nature 
confers on all natural entities their intrinsic value.  Why is this intrinsic value not strictly 
moral?  I said above that only self-conscious beings, taken solely to be humans, can be said to 
be moral agents.  What singles out humans as moral agents?  It is the peculiar evolutionary 
endowments we have.  All natural entities have peculiar evolutionary endowments.  The 
peculiar evolutionary endowment of birds is what enables them to fly.  As humans we are 
subjects of autonomous choices and are capable of reflection and understanding in a way that 
other beings are not.  These are the peculiar endowments that make us moral agents.  It is from 
the point of view of these peculiar endowments that we can say that humans are moral agents 
and their intrinsic value is strictly moral.  The moral value of other natural entities is 
contingent on this human peculiarity.  As I said above, because we are moral agents, what we 
do to the rest of nature can be either moral or immoral.  It is therefore in relation to us that 
their moral value lies.  The bird I mentioned above has peculiar endowments that make it 
possible for it to fly.  Such endowments belong to its intrinsic nature and make it, if you will, a 
flying agent or flying being.  The peculiar endowments that make us moral agents belong also 
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to our intrinsic nature.  But the intrinsic nature that makes all natural entities intrinsically 
value-able is based on their origin. 
 I believe that I have made the case, in my discussion of the ontological independence 
of the environment, that everything that is created is created for a purpose while the 
environment exists in a purposeless manner. That something exists or was brought into being 
for a purpose means that it is instrumental to achieving that purpose.  A bird’s nest serves as 
an instrument for housing it, its eggs, and its fledglings.  If the bird does not have that need, 
the nest would not exist.  It is clear then that the nest cannot be said to have the same value as 
a river.  This is because it is not true that if there is no need for the river to perform certain 
functions, it would not exist.  The river has no creator who created it for that purpose.  In this 
sense, its value is intrinsic while that of the nest is instrumental.  As Callicott has pointed out, 
“…if tools have no instrumental value they would not exist…And since such things exist by 
artifice, not by nature, if they had not been invented they would not exist.”90Another way of 
saying that something is not created is to say, a la Callicott, that it exists by nature.  It is this 
existence by nature that confers on it its ontological independence and its intrinsic value. 
I can only make the case for the intrinsic value of the environment from the 
perspective of its ontological independence—its existence by nature and not by design.  
Rolston has argued that all living things have intrinsic value in the sense that they are ends in 
themselves and thus have a good of their own.  This, he argues, puts them on a par with us as 
living beings.  Paul Taylor also argues that as moral agents, the reason we should regard other 
entities, which he calls “wild living things” as having intrinsic value is that it disposes us to 
give consideration to their own “good”.  He bases this disposition on what he calls a “...belief 
system that constitutes a particular view or outlook on nature and the place of human life in 
it.”91 Taylor’s belief system is the one that posits that humans are not superior to other entities 
in the environment.  He asserts that the presence of humans in the environment is not 
necessary in itself nor is it necessary for the survival of the other entities in the environment.  
He argues that it is rather the existence of these other entities that is necessary for human 
existence.  “Indeed, from their standpoint the very existence of humans is quite unnecessary.  
Every last man, woman, and child could disappear from the face of the earth without any 
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significant detrimental consequence for the good of wild animals and plants.  On the contrary, 
many of them would be greatly benefited.  The destruction of their habitats by human 
‘development’ would cease.  The poisoning and polluting of their environment would come to 
an end.”92 Max Scheler makes the same claim when he pointed out that we—as animals—
depend on other animals, plants and inorganic entities for our very survival.  “The inorganic 
world in its autonomy displays a proud independence. Plant and animal face man in proud 
independence; the animal is more dependent upon the existence of plant life than vice 
versa.”93   Max Scheler’s point is that it is the organic entities that need the inorganic for their 
very survival and not the other way round.  Taylor’s focus is on the biotic community.  But if, 
as he rightly points out, humans cannot exist without plants and other animals, plants and 
animals cannot equally exist without the inorganic entities that supply them with the vital 
energy for survival. 
How does this advance the intrinsic value of the environment?  The ontological 
independence of the environment has helped to establish that the environment exists 
independently of any creator.  However, as we have seen from both Taylor and Scheler, there 
is interdependence among all the entities in the environment.  This is what is known as the 
ecosystem or the ecological community.  It is crucial to keep in mind that ontological 
independence is based on the provenance of the environment.  I have been insisting that this 
provenance is purely accidental and not willful.  As members of the ecological community, we 
are in a unique position that allows us, given our endowments and capacity, to understand our 
world and our place in it.  Taylor has proposed that such understanding should give rise to a 
belief system through which we should be conscious that we are not superior to other natural 
entities in the environment.  This, according to him, should in turn lead to our respect for 
nature. 
I think a proper understanding of our place in nature should lead us to the fact that we 
evolved like every other natural entity in the environment.  This is why I think that although 
the natural inorganic entities in the environment can exist without the organic entities while 
the organic ones depend on them for their survival, we cannot credit them with willfully 
creating the organic entities.  We are all products of natural accidental processes.  The issue of 
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basing our respect for nature on the good of the entities may be slippery because we cannot 
say with certainty what that good is.  However, I think we can base our respect for nature on 
the fact that we do not ultimately control the processes that brought about its existence. 
Since instrumental value is tied in with purpose, and the environment is purposeless, 
we can therefore only approach it with a concept of intrinsic value.  Intrinsic value will 
therefore be based on our understanding of both the nature of the environment and our place in 
it.  This is why I think that grounding the intrinsic value of entities on their nature is 
promising.  Intrinsic value therefore becomes our way of acknowledging the nature of the 
entities to whom we ascribe it.  But we do not have to equate our understanding of intrinsic 
value with its dependence on us.  Given our endowments, we see what is there and try to make 
sense of it by saying that it has intrinsic value.  It is the way we understand it.  It is 
anthropocentric only in the sense that it is the way we understand it and present it to ourselves.  
But it is not anthropogenic in the sense that we put it there.  As it is with our eyes, so it is with 
our minds.  We see what is there and try to make sense of it.  If we can appropriately describe 
what is before us, then it can help us to fashion our attitude towards it.  Our awareness, as Paul 
Taylor has pointed out, that it would go on being what it is even without us, should help us to 
adopt the right attitude to it. 
If, as humans, we have the awareness of our oneness with nature, then we cannot base 
the intrinsic value of the entities in the environment on any purpose they may or may not 
serve.  Such value can only be instrumental.  We cannot also base it on the fact of the 
interdependence of all the entities in the environment.  My reason for saying this is that, as 
humans, we can replace the role a particular natural entity plays in the environment by 
creating an artificial likeness of that entity.  Such an entity would then lose its value, in as 
much as such value is based on the role it plays in the ecosystem. 
The issue becomes rather contentious when intrinsic function is brought into the 
equation. Korsgaard, for instance, holds that what distinguishes intrinsic value is not its non-
instrumentality but the fact that it does not get its value from outside of itself.  What is 
important here is how one understands instrumental value.  An intrinsic function is the 
function a particular object is made to perform.  Such a function will therefore be its raison d’ 
être. But one needs to distinguish artifacts from natural objects.  No natural object could be 
said to have an intrinsic function, as its raison d’être.    Something functions as means to some 
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end.  And for something to have an intrinsic function, as Korsgaard argues, means that without 
such a function it loses its intrinsic value. It is important to distinguish the function or role an 
entity plays from its nature.  It is the nature of the river to flow, as it is the nature humans to 
think, reflect, and understand. For now, I will group all these peculiar human characteristics 
under understanding. But are flowing and understanding their intrinsic functions?  It is true 
that a body of water that does not flow cannot be called a river, but it does not by that fact stop 
being a body of water.  Conversely, a human that does not understand cannot be said to have 
ceased being human by that very fact alone.  So, it is problematic to say that those 
characteristics are their intrinsic functions, understood as their raison d’ être.  It may be more 
plausible to say that it is in the nature of those entities to be that way.  But their not being that 
way should not translate into saying that they are not intrinsically value-able.  But Korsgaard 
argues against this.  She thinks that what a thing does is what gives it meaning.  She finds this 
expression in the Aristotelian teleological argument.  “According to Aristotle, what makes an 
object the kind of object that it is—what gives it its identity—is what it does, or in Greek, its 
ergon: that is, its purpose, function, or characteristic activity.  This is clearest in the case of 
artifacts.”94 I would say that this is true about artifacts, but not about natural entities.  The 
purpose they may serve is not what gives them their intrinsic value or meaning.  We can 
indeed describe what a natural entity does, given its nature, but should we conclude from that 
description that it is that activity that gives it its meaning?  What happens when we do not get 
the description right, believing all the same that we did?  Again, what happens to its intrinsic 
value if it ceases to function in that particular manner, as is the case with many human beings?  
I therefore do not think we should take the instrumental value, or any purpose that the natural 
entities in the environment may have, as their meaning.  The value of a bird’s nest is found in 
the fact that it is a nest—for the bird, her eggs, and fledglings.  And that is its raison d’être.  
So its value is purely instrumental and cannot be intrinsic. It is easy to comprehend that what 
has intrinsic value can also have instrumental value.  But this does not seem to be what 
Korsgaard is saying.  In her theory, intrinsic value and intrinsic function are playing the same 
role in both artifacts and natural entities.  “…to be an object, and to have this kind of 
normative form—that is, to be teleologically constructed—are one and the same thing.”95    
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If this is taken literally, it brings up the issue of design.  Are the river and the human 
designed to flow and to understand?  If so, who designed them that way?  Would it be an 
intelligent designer, as some people believe?  I do not think so.  I would rather say that it is in 
the nature of the river to flow and the human to understand.  Could that nature be adequately 
described as intrinsic function?  I would say that these are evolutionary traits or endowments 
that distinguish these entities.  If a human does not understand, whether she is fully human or 
not does not make her any less intrinsically value-able.  If a body of water does not flow, we 
will not call it a river.  But it does not make the water any less natural and intrinsically value-
able.    So, it may not be plausible to argue that the river is designed to flow and the human to 
think.  
The intrinsic value of an entity is what it has in virtue of its nature; its instrumental 
value, on the other hand, is accidental.  Artifacts can only have instrumental value, which 
would qualify as intrinsic function.  As Brennan remarks:  “Natural objects contrast with 
artifacts.  Both sorts of objects have structure of varying complexity and both can have 
functions…But the function of an artifact is the result of design, and this design is intended to 
satisfy some end.  By saying this, I mean to count the beaver lodges as artifacts, but not coral 
reefs …natural individuals, whether microbes or tigers have no intrinsic functions at all.”96 
Beaver lodges would be akin to birds’ nests while coral reefs, like mountains, evolve through 
accidental natural processes.  In differentiating intrinsic value from instrumental value, Katz 
offers this analogy:   “As an individual human being, a university student possesses personal 
characteristics that give him intrinsic value.  As a student this individual also serves a function 
that is valuable to the community of which he is a member: he attends classes, interacts with 
the faculty, and uses the facilities of the campus.”97 If I understand Katz well enough, then it 
can be said that the roles such an individual plays are not what confers on him intrinsic value.  
It is rather the personal characteristics he possesses that point to his intrinsic value.  For 
natural objects, such characteristics would be their ontological independence.  From this 
analogy, Katz derives the intrinsic value of the entities in the environment. “The intrinsic 
value of an entity is based on its own independent properties.”98  It does not need anything 
outside of itself to confer this value on it.  Katz continues: “…Part of what we mean by the 
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intrinsic value of natural entities is their source or origin—what caused them to be what they 
are.  A natural entity possesses intrinsic value to some extent because it is natural, an entity 
that arose through processes that are not artificially human.  This ‘naturalness’ is one of the 
properties that gives it its value.”99    
 
I.  THE OBJECTIVIST APPROACH 
Holmes Rolston III100, among environmental philosophers, has perhaps devoted the 
most time and energy to the concept of the intrinsic value of the environment. This is because 
he takes it to be a sine qua non for any meaningful environmental ethic.  This is not to say that 
other environmental philosophers do not see the central place occupied by the concept in 
environmental philosophy.  Callicott has declared as much when he said that it is “…the 
central theoretical quest of environmental philosophy—intrinsic value for non human natural 
entities and nature as a whole.”101 Even those who do not agree with Rolston’s point of 
departure acknowledge the crucial role that intrinsic value plays for any meaningful 
environmental ethic. 
Rolston takes the intrinsic value of the environment to be quite objective.  However, 
his emphasis, like that of Paul Taylor and Kenneth Goodpaster, is on the biotic community.  
They all find intrinsic value in all living beings.  For Taylor, every living being has a good of 
its own.  For Rolston, they both have and defend a good of their own.  For Goodpaster, it is 
just the fact that they live.  (I will elaborate on Goodpaster’s point later).  What all these 
accounts have in common is that there is good, or worth, or value that is inherent in nature. I 
need to point out here that although Rolston’s emphasis is on the biotic community, he leaves 
open other possibilities when he alludes to whole systems, albeit in reference to the biotic 
community.  Such a possibility would include the whole of the ecosystem.  Rolston’s point is 
that intrinsic value is not dependent on consciousness.  According to Callicott, “Rolston’s 
achievement…is quite extraordinary.  For without expressly challenging the broadly modern 
metaphysical assumptions bequeathed to Western thought by Descartes, Rolston has freed 
intrinsic value from its dependency not only on a self-conscious human subject, but even on a 
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conscious animal subject.”102 Rolston also makes an interesting, if not ingenious, distinction 
between what is valuable and what is value-able.  Valuable, according to him, is the judgment 
of a subject in respect of an object or even another subject, but usually from the point of view 
of expediency.  Valuable therefore would readily fit into what has been described as 
instrumental value.  Value-able, on the other hand, denotes the intrinsic value of the 
environment.  It is its ability to, independently, generate value.  This sharply distinguishes it 
from extrinsic and instrumental value.  “A sentient valuer is not necessary for value.  Another 
way is for there to be a value-generating system able to generate value, such as a plant or a 
genome.  If you like, that is another meaning of value-er; any x is value-able if x is able to 
produce values.”103  In making the case for the intrinsic value of the environment, Rolston 
contends that nature, meaning the biotic community, is value-able, given their evolutionary 
endowments seen in what he calls their “…inventiveness, strategy, remarkable efficiency, 
wisdom of the genes, exquisite organization to accomplish delicate tasks…”104  He therefore 
defines these organisms as value-able, due to their ability to produce values, in human terms.  
This, according to him, is true of living organisms, from the unicellular to the multicellular. 
For Rolston, as Callicot has remarked, it is not necessary that this should be a conscious 
process.  Callicott’s comment is quite illuminating.  As he aptly points out, “A philanderer, for 
example, may not realize that he loves his wife until she leaves him.  The reason that 
Rolston’s biocentric account of intrinsic value is so persuasive is precisely because 
nonconscious organisms can be plausibly portrayed as self-valuing beings, even though they 
can have no experience of doing so.”105 Callicott, having accepted, somewhat reluctantly, 
Rolston’s thesis that valuing can be done unconsciously, goes on to argue for vertebragenic 
valuing saying that “…nonhuman animals, all vertebrates at the very least, are conscious and 
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therefore may be said, in the widest sense of the term, to value things.”106   Rolston asks: “Do 
not humans value Earth because it is valuable, and not the other way round? Is the value in 
this life-support system really just a matter of late-coming human interests or is Earth not 
historically a remarkable, valuable place prior to the human arrival and even now valuable 
antecedently to the human uses of it?”107 This is the crux of Rolston’s claim that intrinsic 
value is objective.  In adopting Rolston’s account of objective value in the environment, I need 
to point out that saying that organisms are self-valuing is an interpretation that we humans 
make.  It is the way we, as conscious beings, describe what is going on in nature.  So when we 
say that the unconscious entities are value-able, we need to keep in mind that these entities are 
the way they are, that is, unconscious, and that they can continue being that way even if we are 
not there to describe what is going on.  As a human being, I am conscious of my intrinsic 
value and I can assert it.  Non-human entities are not able to do this.  But the fact that we are 
able to recognize the intrinsic value of such entities does not mean that we are the ones that 
produce the value. 
If the intrinsic value of nature is not objective, it would mean that nature has no value 
except the one bestowed on it by subjects.  For Callicot, it would be vertebrates.  Rolston notes 
that Callicott’s vertebragenic axiology is welcome as a possibility but points out that it is not 
the end of the story as it severely limits what is value-able in the world.  “Callicott’s 
vertebragenic value”, says Rolston, “still leaves most of the world valueless, since the 
vertebrates are only about 4 percent of the described species.  Indeed, since the numbers of 
individuals in vertebrate species is typically much lower than the numbers of individuals in 
invertebrate or plant species, real valuers form only some miniscule fraction of the living 
organisms on Earth”108  It is certain to Rolston that there can be value without valuers.  
According to him, when we use the word “benefit”, we are referring to value, like when we 
say that plants benefit from sunshine.  “…benefit is—everywhere else we encounter it—a 
value word.”109 I have already pointed out that value denotes worth, so benefit, a value word, 
should be understood in that sense. 
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Rolston’s point is plausible.  However, the problem with it is that, just as he finds 
subjectivist valuers guilty of severely limiting the presence of value in the world, he too limits 
value in the world to the biotic community which equally makes up an infinitesimal part of the 
natural world.   
Rolston’s stance would make little or no sense at all to human idealists like John 
Locke, Korsgaard, or the early Callicott, for whom value is both anthropocentric and 
anthropogenic.  For Korsgaard, for instance, even though the environment may be a bearer of 
values, it still depends on the human being to confer that value.  Commenting on Nietzsche’s 
inquiry into the value of value, she says that “The value of values comes from valuers, and not 
the reverse, and that fact—that we are the source of value—is also what makes us worthy of 
moral consideration.  Humanity, not the standards implicit in social practices, is the ultimate 
source of value.”110 I agree with Korsgaard that our presence, given our evolutionary 
endowments, is important in the theory of axiology.  However, I find it difficult to draw the 
same conclusion she does, namely, that humans are the ultimate source of value.  We may be 
the ultimate source of the recognition of value.  But this is only because the entities in the 
environment, given their nature, which is their ontological independence, possess intrinsic 
value which we recognize.  But our recognition of that value does not mean that we are its 
source.  Our difference from the rest of nature is one of degree.  If we accept that, then we can 
also accept the quotation from Thoreau, cited at the beginning of this chapter.  We can 
therefore say that the consciousness of our oneness with nature, what Paul Taylor says should 
form our belief system, should prevent us from saying that we are the source of its value.  We 
evolved like every other entity in the environment.  But our unique endowments do not make 
us superior to all the other natural entities in the environment.  As Paul Taylor asks, “Why 
should the arrangement of genes of a certain type be a mark of superior value, especially when 
this fact about an organism is taken by itself, unrelated to any other aspect of its life?  We 
might just as well refer to any other genetic make up as a ground of superior value.  Clearly 
we are confronted here with a wholly arbitrary claim that can only be explained as an 
irrational bias in our own favor.”111 Such a claim would be similar to the one we found in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition of the stewardship approach where humans are in charge as 
representatives of God, given their “priviledged” or “god-like” nature. 
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I have claimed that the intrinsic value of the non-human entities in the environment is 
not a moral value.  My reason is that for a being to have an intrinsic moral value, in the strict 
sense of the word, it has to be a moral subject, at least in a potential sense.  One can therefore 
talk of the moral value of non-human nature in contradistinction to the moral value of humans 
who are moral agents. I am arguing that only human beings can be said to be moral subjects 
because of their evolutionary endowments that makes them subjects of autonomous choices. 
In other words, humans possess a peculiar nature which other entities do not have. Other 
natural entities equally possess peculiar endowments which humans do not have.  As members 
of the ecological community, we should extend our moral considerability or attention to the 
other entities in the environment.  However, we cannot equate that moral considerability112 
with moral agency; nor the intrinsic value of nonhuman nature with moral value of humans.  
Since it is only humans that possess a peculiar nature that make them moral agents, that is, 
subjects of autonomous choices, reflection, understanding, responsibility; it is only humans 
that can be said to be moral agents and not the other natural entities in the environment.  The 
latter can have moral value only in respect to human beings who are moral agents.  Therefore, 
if intrinsic value implies moral agency, then it would be absurd to talk of the environment as 
having intrinsic value.  As Nietzsche has pointed out, “It is absurd to praise and censure nature 
and necessity.”113 Narveson would also be right in saying that “…the view that Nature Itself is 
a sort of moral agent in her own right is, I am bound to say, one of the most deeply incoherent 
views in the whole philosophical world, not easily matched by any of the legendary 
metaphysicians.”114   
There are, says Sterba, several approaches one can have to practical problems.  One 
can have either a moral or a nonmoral approach.  “Nonmoral approaches to  practical 
problems include the legal approach (what the law requires with respect to this practical 
problem), the group or self-interest approach (what the group or self-interest is of each of the 
parties affected by the problem), and scientific approach (how this practical problem can best 
be accounted for or understood).  To call these approaches nonmoral, of course does not imply 
that they are immoral.  All that is implied is that the requirements of these approaches may or 
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may not accord with the requirements of morality.”115   Sterba then gives two essential 
features of the moral approach: 
 
 1. The approach is prescriptive, that is, it issues in prescriptions, such as, “do this, don’t do 
that.” 
2.  The approach’s prescriptions are acceptable from the standpoint of everyone affected by 
them.116
 
Environmental ethicists have been trying to fulfill these conditions of morality 
without success.  The reason is that the scope of environmental ethics goes beyond human 
beings who are moral agents.  It also goes beyond living beings to include nonliving nature.  
The only way environmental ethics could fulfill the conditions of morality enumerated above 
may be in taking a purely anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics.  Not many 
environmental philosophers are willing to go that route.  One of the reasons is that it smacks of 
the Judeo Christian stewardship approach to environmental ethics, with its attendant 
difficulties, which I have mentioned to above.  It basically consists in not seeing intrinsic 
value but only instrumental value in nonhuman nature.  In other words, what we do to 
nonhuman nature matters and ought to be acceptable to humans who are directly or indirectly 
affected by it.  The other religions discussed in the first chapter fare better in conferring 
intrinsic value to nonhuman nature.  However, the problem, as I also pointed out, is that they 
posit the locus of that value in the invisible world, thereby devaluing the entities in real terms.   
In the quest to properly maintain the scope of environmental ethics as stated, some 
philosophers, like Norton117 simply assert that the intrinsic value of non human nature is 
anthropocentric.  Others, like Rollin (as we shall see shortly), maintain that they are 
instrumental, that is, relative to sentient nature.  On their part, Rolston and Paul Taylor try to 
limit the scope of environmental ethics to living entities that have an “interest” in staying 
alive.  Their intrinsic value, in the Kantian sense, is therefore located in their life.  Aldo 
Leopold, the father of environmental ethics, tried to link the respect for all nature, which he 
called the land, to the ecosystemic well being. 
                                                          
115  Sterba, James P. Earth Ethics, Introductory Readings on Animal Rights and Environmental     Ethics, 
p. 1. 
116 Ibid, p. 2. 
117 Norton, Bryan. “Environmental Problems and the Future Generation”, in Sterba, James P. Ibid, pp. 
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What all these attempts show is that the intrinsic value of all natural entities, whether 
it is anthropocentric or non anthropocentric, is necessary for the grounding environmental 
ethics.  The reason why this move is thought necessary, is that intrinsic value has been 
understood in the Kantian moral sense where what has intrinsic value, namely humans, are the 
only beings worthy of moral consideration.  For Kant, what has intrinsic value should never be 
treated as a means but always as an end. 
I propose (in the following section) that we could understand the intrinsic value of 
nonhuman nature as aesthetic.  This would enable us to have a legal approach to their respect.  
It would also achieve the same aim as that of the environmental philosophers who want to 
ground the respect for nature on intrinsic moral value.  A legal approach is also not immoral.  
Nor is it amoral.  As I will show later, it implies moral considerability. 
The intrinsic value of humans is based on the understanding that we are ends in 
ourselves, that is, not made to be instruments to any particular end.  What gives humans such 
an ontological status is the fact that we evolved naturally and accidentally, just like all natural 
objects.  So, what we, as late comers to the universe, have in common with the other entities in 
the environment is our common origin.  We therefore owe them respect as members of the 
ecological community with whom we share the same origin.  If that origin confers intrinsic 
value on us, it also confers it on them, ipso facto.  The reason I maintain that such an origin 
confers intrinsic value on all who partake of it is that, given its purposelessness, it cannot be 
said to confer extrinsic or instrumental value on us.  Extrinsic and instrumental values belong 
to artifacts.  I am not denying that natural entities can have extrinsic and instrumental values.  
But in contradistinction from artifacts, such values cannot be said to be their raison d’ être.  
So, from the point of view of origin, our intrinsic nature is the same as that of other natural 
entities in the environment.  It is on this intrinsic nature, according to Moore, that the intrinsic 
value of the environment is based. 
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II. ONTOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE, ANTHROPOCENTRISM AND THE 
INTRINSIC AESTHETIC VALUE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant outlines how knowledge is centered on the 
knowing subject through what he calls the pure concepts of the understanding.  It is on these 
pure concepts that knowledge depends.  And being pure concepts, they do not have to depend 
on experience.  At the beginning of the book, he stated: “That all our knowledge begins with 
experience there can be no doubt.”118 But in the very next paragraph, he says that knowledge 
beginning with experience does not mean arising from experience.  For knowledge to be valid, 
it has to conform to what he calls the internal sense.  “…all phenomena are not things by 
themselves, but only the play of our representations, all of which are in the end determinations 
only of the internal sense.”119  Knowledge is therefore, as Kant has shown, anthropocentric. 
Environmental philosophers try to downplay the role of the mind in the acquisition of 
knowledge.  Some cite Putnam`s twin earth thought experiment to show that meaning is not in 
the mind.  According to Callicott, knowledge is fundamentally physical. “As science looks 
deeper and deeper into the farther reaches of space and time and into the finest structures of 
matter, it becomes more and more apparent that knowledge is fundamentally physical—not 
attribute of a nonphysical substance, the Cartesian thinking thing or passive sapient subject.  
Energy is among other things, information and information is energy.”120   The aim of this 
approach is to show that as humans we are first and foremost part of the environment.  This is 
supposed to foster environmental consciousness or what some call the “environmental turn”.  I 
am skeptical about the importance of this approach whose ultimate aim, I believe, is to 
establish that since the human mind is part of the environment, then as humans, we owe the 
same moral duties to humans and to the environment as a whole.  Knowledge needs concepts 
and a concept is still a concept whether it starts from the mind or from the environment.  As a 
concept, it is limiting. 
Kant has shown that human knowledge depends on our concepts.  But, granted that 
concepts are indispensable to our knowledge; could we also say that concepts are 
indispensable to our aesthetic appreciation of nature?  Kant’s answer in the Critique of the 
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120 Callicott, J. Baird. Beyond the Land Ethic, More essays on Environmental Ethic, p. 231-232. 
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Power of Judgment is negative.  For him the appreciation of nature is conceptless.  As in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, where knowledge is centered on the knowing subject, in the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, the aesthetics of nature is also centered on the subject, but with a 
crucial difference.  Whereas in the Critique of Pure Reason, the subject brings her pure 
concepts of the understanding to phenomena, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment the 
appreciation of nature is conceptless.  Kant’s treatment of the appreciation of nature is 
remarkable in the sense that in this work, one notices a considerable difference from the tone 
of the arguments in the first two Critiques.  As Wood points out, “…the Critique of Judgment 
reveals Kant, now in his late sixties, as a philosopher who is still willing to question and even 
revise the fundamental tenets of his system”121 I agree with Wood that in the Critique of 
Judgment, there is a certain kind of opening one may not find in the first two Critiques.   
In the Critique of Judgment, then, Kant outlines his arguments for a conceptless, pre-
theoretical appreciation of natural objects by a subject through an immediate encounter 
between the two.  At the same time Kant argues that this appreciation and its resultant 
aesthetic judgment, although grounded on a subjective experience, can lay claim to universal 
validity. 
When I say that something is beautiful, what does that mean to Kant?  Something that 
is beautiful is something that evokes in me an immediate feeling of pleasure.  Immediate here 
means without concept. My judgment of the thing as beautiful is not as a result of my 
knowledge of it but purely an emotional judgment.  Kant puts it this way: “The beautiful is 
that which, without concepts, is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction.”122 So, 
when I say something like, “the countryside is beautiful”, “the animal is beautiful”; I am, 
according to Kant, making a judgment of taste or aesthetic judgment. This kind of judgment 
contrasts with a cognitive judgment which is a judgment based on the knowledge of the object.  
Pratt et al. comment on this point thus: “The poppy is judged as beautiful not in virtue of my 
concept of it as a particular type of flower, nor in virtue of my knowledge that it is the source 
of opium.  I call it beautiful because the poppy evokes an immediate feeling of pleasure, which 
is a response unmediated by a concept of the object.”123
                                                          
121 Wood Allen, in the introduction, Basic Writings of Kant, p. xix. 
122 Kant, Immanuel. The critique of the power of judgment, p. 182-183. 
123 Pratt, Vernon et al, Environment and philosophy, p. 143. 
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It is easier to appreciate why Kant insists on the conceptlessness of the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature when one keeps in mind his distinction between what is natural and 
artificial in art:   
If someone searching through a moorland bog finds, as sometimes happens, a piece of 
carved wood, he does not say that it is a product of nature, but of art; the cause that 
produced it conceived of an end, which the wood has to thank for its form. In other cases 
too one sees an art in everything that is so constituted that a representation of it in its 
cause must have preceded its reality (as even in the case of bees), although it may not 
exactly have thought of the effect; but if something is called a work of art without 
qualification, in order to distinguish it from an effect of nature; then by that is always 
understood a work of human beings.124   
 
Kant does not think that other animals, apart from human beings possess rationality, 
and that is why he seems reluctant to categorize the products of other animals such as 
honeycombs constructed by bees, and nests constructed by birds, as having the same status as 
human creations.  Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of his point that what is natural is 
what is not created with a purpose in mind, even if that mind is not the human mind. 
Earlier in the work, Kant had distinguished between two types of beauty: free and 
dependent.  Free beauty is self-subsistent beauty, or what I would call ontologically 
independent beauty.  It “…presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second 
does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it.”125  
In this way, we can say that the aesthetic approach to nature is not anthropocentric in 
the sense that it is neither based on our knowledge nor on any human interest or utility.  The 
aesthetic value of nature, seen thus, is therefore intrinsic, as opposed to instrumental.  It may 
then help us to let the environment “speak” to us, instead of us determining a priori what it is. 
We can therefore see that the intrinsic value of the environment is aesthetic and not 
moral.  Moral values are based on mediated, universal concepts that prescribe what ought and 
ought not be done and must be acceptable to all involved, specifically, moral subjects.  
Aesthetic value, on the other hand, does not necessarily depend on concepts, from the point of 
view of the subject.  It does not issue in prescriptions.  In other words, the aesthetic approach 
to nature does not have to fulfill the essential features of morality. Unlike morality, aesthetics 
involves immediacy; it is like ecstasy.  As such it requires no mediation.  As Shakespeare 
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declared, “Beauty itself doth of itself persuade the eyes of men without an orator.”126 The 
Igbos say something similar.127  Alexander Pope affirms the same thing when he said that “All 
nature is but art unknown to thee…one truth is clear, whatever is, is right.”128  Saying that 
nature is art “unknown” could be interpreted to mean that knowledge is not required when 
nature is approached aesthetically. 
What all these expressions point to is that objects that arouse aesthetic interests are 
valued in virtue of their aesthetic qualities, such as the majesty of a waterfall, the colour 
combinations of an animal or plant, etc, which these natural entities possess.  These objects 
evoke immediate emotional feelings. They are, according to Nietzsche “…artistic energies 
which burst forth from nature herself, without the mediation of the human artist; energies in 
which nature’s art-impulses are satisfied in the most immediate and direct way…”129
The aesthetic experience of nature is an immediate experience quite distinct from the 
aesthetic experience one can have before any created work or artifact. Such experience 
distinguishes what is natural from and what is artificial.  Whereas the aesthetic value of the 
environment is an intrinsic value; that of artifacts is not.  This is because artifacts are made 
with a purpose in the mind of their creators and can only have value in that context alone—
that is, the context of the intention of their creators.  (This, of course, does not rule out 
accidental meanings they may come to have for some people). What underscores this 
difference is the essentially different origins of both nature and artifacts.   Our encounter with 
nature is marked by perpetual wonder. In the case of artifacts, they may instill some wonder in 
us, but the fact that we are able to explain their origin makes such wonder very ephemeral.  
One can also understand Heraclitus’ saying that nature loves to hide in this context.  We 
cannot say the same thing of artifacts.    As Pratt et al. point out,  
An artwork is first and foremost an intentional product.  As such it is an object that 
embodies the ideas of its maker.  It follows from this that our response to artworks is 
shaped and in some sense controlled by the properties of the particular object—the 
colours, lines, forms and images on a canvas, or the notes and melodies of a tune. Our 
experience is thus directed by cues in the artwork through whatever particular medium we 
encounter.  In this way, the experience is overlaid by an awareness that the object is 
intentional so that we seek meaning in the object through aesthetic engagement with it.   
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The meanings we seek are there to be found, and we attribute such meanings to the artist 
who has ‘purpose-built’ the object for our interpretation and enjoyment.130
 
 If one accepts the distinction between intrinsic value and instrumental value, 
where what has intrinsic value has it—in contrast to instrumental and extrinsic value—in its 
being and not by virtue of any purpose it is meant to serve, then one can see why the aesthetic 
value of the environment, since it has no purpose built into it, is an intrinsic value.  
Purposelessness, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, therefore confers, not only 
ontological independence but equally aesthetic independence on the environment. 
So, where artifacts could be said to have only instrumental aesthetic value, natural 
entities have intrinsic aesthetic value, based on their ontological independence; this makes our 
appreciation of them disinterested.  One can therefore say that nature is, aesthetically, an end 
in itself.  Respecting nature would therefore be a way of respecting her intrinsic aesthetic 
value. 
Eugene Hargrove, in his “The Aesthetics of Wildlife Preservation”, argues that 
nature’s intrinsic value is aesthetic.  However, he also argues that both natural entities and 
artworks have aesthetic intrinsic value.  He goes on to show that this value is both 
anthropocentric and non anthropocentric.  In other words, for him, nonhuman nature has both 
intrinsic and instrumental aesthetic value.  Natural aesthetics, he says, evolved directly out of 
art aesthetics.  “…the movement was from the ideal to the actual or real, from the general or 
universal to the particular or individual, and from the artificial to the natural in such a way that 
aesthetic appreciation became focused on natural objects and living organisms as objects of 
interest for their own sake.”131
According to Hargrove’s argument, there are general principles or forms, in the 
Platonic sense, involved in aesthetic judgment.  When a person first sees a wild animal, for 
instance, she will be try to discern the characteristic properties of the species the animal 
represents.  She would therefore need to see different animals of the same species before she 
can have “…an adequately generalized conception of what a member of that particular species 
should look like”132  This is a good example of a science based approach to natural aesthetics.  
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But there is surely a difference between, for instance, an ant scholar and the person who 
contemplates an ant for its own sake.  The former is seeking knowledge while the latter simply 
marvels, in a disinterested manner, in the wonder of the ant.  This, I think, is why 
Krishnamurti, an Indian mystic, was reported to have said that “The day you teach the child 
the name of the bird, the child will not see that bird again.”133   Korsgaard was also talking in 
the same manner when she said that “…I think you could be dazzled by a spectacular sunset 
even if it is the only one you ever saw, and no one in your culture talked about such things.  It 
might just strike you as being perfect of its kind, where its kind is given just by itself.  That is 
what the most beautiful things are like.”134
Hargrove takes a similar view in the appreciation of non animal nature such as 
mountains.  Such appreciation could be done without the framework of forms.  In other words, 
conceptless, in the Kantian sense. 
A very important point in Hargrove’s argument is that the intrinsic aesthetic value of 
nature is not necessarily non anthropocentric.  This is because, according to him, “Our 
aesthetic appreciation of art objects requires anthropocentric intrinsic value of some kind.”135  
He therefore concludes that the intrinsic aesthetic value of nature is both in the experience and 
in the object itself.  What this means is that attributing value to an object does not mean that 
the value cannot be non anthropocentric.  Although such an object may have instrumental 
value, its intrinsic value overrides its instrumental value.   Hargrove gives an example of how 
an aesthetic object can be valued both intrinsically and instrumentally:  “…cave formations 
and prehistoric cave paintings can be damaged and destroyed by fungus that grows using the 
light required for tourist viewing.  When such objects are protected by turning out the lights 
and discontinuing the tours, they are considered to be of intrinsic value.   If the tours are 
continued until the objects are destroyed and the tours no longer profitable, the value of the 
objects is instrumental only…”136
Another difficulty with Hargrove’s view, apart from the one I have already pointed 
out concerning the contemplation of animals, is that he lumps together natural objects and 
artifacts, which are representations of natural objects simply because they both have aesthetic 
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value for humans.  The artifacts are made to satisfy human aesthetic pleasure, in that sense 
they are purely instrumental.  The same thing cannot be said of natural entities that have 
intrinsic aesthetic value, owing to the fact that they were not originally produced to satisfy any 
aesthetic pleasure. 
However, it is important to note that Hargrove emphasizes that humans must 
cooperate in the respect for the intrinsic aesthetic value of nature. 
Bernard Rollin also suggests such cooperation in the respect of aesthetically valuable 
objects.  However, unlike Hargrove, he does not think non-sentient natural entities have 
intrinsic value even though his concern is more explicitly moral.  For him, the value of non-
sentient natural entities is contingent on their importance to sentient beings.  “Why grant 
animals rights and acknowledge in animals intrinsic value?  Because they are conscious and 
what we do to them matters to them?  Why grant rocks, or trees, or species, or ecosystems 
rights?  Because these objects have great aesthetic value, or are essential to us, or basic for our 
survival?  But these are paradigmatic examples of instrumental value.”137  The aesthetic value 
Rollin talks of is for sentient beings.  As he said, it is purely instrumental.  But he goes on to 
talk of the moral power of aesthetic claims.  “Too many philosophers, forget the moral power 
of aesthetic claims and tend to see aesthetic reasons as a weak basis for preserving natural 
objects.”138
I find it difficult to follow Rollin’s line of argument.  On the one hand there is the 
direct moral concern for sentient beings who have intrinsic value, and on the other the moral 
power of aesthetic claims.  Having argued that aesthetic value is purely instrumental, I do not 
see how it can also be moral.  As we shall see later, Rollin talks rather of a legal framework 
for the respect of the aesthetic value of objects. 
So far we have arrived at a clear distinction between what is natural and what is 
artificial as it concerns aesthetics.  What is natural is appreciated in a pre-theoretical, 
conceptless manner simply because it is not created with any concept in mind.  As I said 
earlier, Kant argues that the appreciation of what is natural, although grounded on subjective 
feelings, can lay claim to universal validity.  In the rest of this section, I want to inquire 
whether this manner of appreciation is unique to human beings.  If it is not, then it could help 
to establish the aesthetic independence of natural entities.  Here I am following the tradition in 
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environmental philosophy that is based on making the value of the environment as little 
anthropogenic as possible. 
The aesthetic experience of nature is usually neither concept nor knowledge based.  
For Kant, to say that something is beautiful is not tantamount to making an objective 
statement.  It simply means that there is an agreement between the perceptual qualities of the 
object and what he calls the mental qualities of the imagination and understanding.  Now, 
these mental qualities are common to every human being as long as she wants to make an 
aesthetic judgment by means of the understanding and sensation.139 Kant therefore defines 
what is beautiful thus: “That is beautiful which pleases without a concept.”140 Kant’s point is 
that what is beautiful for any one human being should ipso facto be beautiful for every human 
being even though it is not based on any concept or any knowledge. The reason why aesthetic 
judgment is subjective for Kant is not because “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”—which 
Kant repudiated—but rather because first, it arises not from a concept of the object but rather 
from a feeling in the subject and secondly, it arises in an encounter between the one who 
appreciates and the object of his/her appreciation. 
Kant goes to a great length to show how a subjective aesthetic judgment can have 
universal validity.  An important feature of this argument is what he calls disinterestedness.  
This concept could be interpreted in the light of his other concept that no human being should 
be seen as a means to an end but rather as an end itself.  As I have already pointed out.  We 
approach nature aesthetically when we have no aim to use her as a means to any sensory or 
utilitarian gratification. This quality of disinterestedness gives aesthetic judgment universal 
validity.  It is also this quality that led Kant to say that aesthetic judgment even though 
grounded on subjectivity, is neither strictly subjective nor objective.  This is because it asserts 
the agreement of others and a universal validity.  This makes it to lie between subjectivity and 
objectivity.141
The attempt to deal with this subjectivity and objectivity as regards environmental 
aesthetics has led to the debate as to whether it should be science or non-science based.  This 
has also led people to inquire whether other beings, apart from humans, appreciate nature.  
Those who argue for the science-based approach place a strong epistemological conditionality 
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when they maintain that we need knowledge of the natural sciences for our appreciation of 
nature.  The concern of the proponents of the science-based model is for an appropriate 
appreciation of the entities in the environment.  According to Carlson, this is important, 
otherwise a whale could easily be called a bloated fish.  “The rorqual whale is a graceful and 
majestic mammal.  However, were it perceived as a fish, it would appear more lumbering, 
somewhat oafish, perhaps even a bit clumsy (may be somewhat like a basking shark).”142It is 
this concern that leads them to propose “appropriate” perception of the environment.    This 
would be similar to Hargrove’s appreciation of wild animals, based on general principles and 
forms. This is the type of argument that Carroll objects to in his article “On Being Moved by 
Nature: Between Religion and Natural History” where he objects to Carlson’s argument that 
the appreciation of the natural environment requires a model.143  Carroll argues that there are 
“…certain very common appreciative responses to nature—responses of less intellective, more 
visceral sort, which we refer to as ‘being moved by nature’…For example, we may find 
ourselves standing under a thundering waterfall and be excited by its grandeur…”144  This 
emotional arousal by nature, according to Carroll, is “pre-theoretical”. 
Kantianism is quite concerned about the universalizability of (human) rational 
activities.  Despite this concern, Kant insisted that the aesthetic appreciation of nature is not 
concept and knowledge based.  The science based model depends on scientific concepts which 
respond more readily to the demands of objectivity and universal applicability more than the 
Kantian approach could yield.   
As Carroll has rightly pointed out, being moved by nature does not require any 
epistemological initiation.  This is because one could be “overwhelmed” or “excited” 
immediately by the grandeur of a waterfall, or some other natural scene. No epistemological or 
cognitive mediation is needed for this experience to be valid.  What this requires is being able 
to be “moved” by nature, as in the case of chimps appreciating the sunset.  Noel continues: 
“Perhaps it only requires being human, equipped with the senses we have, being small and 
able to intuit… Nor need the common sense of our culture come into play.  Conceivably 
humans from other planets bereft of waterfalls could share our sense of grandeur.”145
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This type of allusion to beings from other planets is what the alternative approach 
responds to.  It brings to mind the twin earth thought experiment.  It also responds to the 
question of the intrinsic value of the environment, that is, value that does not depend for its 
existence on valuers, even though its recognition may rightly be said to depend on them.  If 
other beings from other planets could find the environment valuable, then we might say that 
the existence of its value does not depend on (human) valuers.  In other words, the value of the 
earth or the universe would be guaranteed even if there are no humans on it.  
These valuers will, in the Kantian sense, be valuing or appreciating the environment 
in a disinterested way, based on subjective feelings which (legitimately) could lay claim to 
universal validity.  Rolston has put it rather powerfully when he said that “To say that 
something is intrinsically valuable means that it is of such kind that were valuers to arrive they 
might value it intrinsically rather than instrumentally.  The trilobites that went extinct before 
humans evolved were (potentially) intrinsically valuable.  Undiscovered species on Earth now 
or on uninhabited planets are intrinsically valuable in this potential sense.”146
Seen in this way, the alternative aesthetic approach lends support to the intrinsic value 
of the environment.  It also makes the point that this value is aesthetic value.  This is because 
the other beings will be valuing the environment in a disinterested, purely aesthetic manner. 
Or, at least, their interest could not be same as ours.  
 In the next, and last, chapter, I explore the implications of both the ontological 
independence and intrinsic aesthetic value of the environment for its respect and rights.  What 
type of right does the environment have and what should be our attitude to that right?   In 
other words, what type of environmental ethic could we derive from these concepts? 
                                                          
146 Rolston,  Holmes. Environmental Ethics, p. 114.  
 
 59
                                            CHAPTER FOUR 
NATURAL RIGHT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
“The land ethic of course cannot prevent the 
alteration, management, and use of these 
‘resources’, but it does affirm their right to 
continued existence, and , at least in spots their 
continued existence in natural state.”147
 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Given the intrinsic value of the environment, what kind of right does it have?  In the 
preceding chapter, I argued that this intrinsic value is aesthetic and not moral.  Here I also 
want to argue that the right of the entities in the environment is natural and not moral.  I will 
also make a case for the legal right of the non-human entities in the environment. As the title 
of this chapter states, my aim here is to sketch an environmental ethic compatible with the 
notions that have been discussed so far.  I begin with the natural right of the environment. 
 
II. NATURAL RIGHT OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
  The words nature and natural have multiple uses and equally multiple 
interpretations in philosophical literature.  They are words that are easily invoked in almost 
every domain to justify certain ideas and practices.  Nowadays, for instance, we often hear 
arguments that it is not natural for humans of the same sex to marry.  On the opposing side is 
the argument that it is natural for humans to do so. 
 For Aristotle, it was simply a fact that some men are slaves by nature while others 
are masters by nature.  Some are strong and some are weak by nature.  It was therefore clear to 
him that it is natural that the strong should lead the weak, and that there should be masters and 
slaves.  It was also clear to him that by nature men are superior to women. 
Many philosophers have reacted to this claim of Aristotle by arguing that all humans 
are by nature equal.  My argument here is that all natural entities are equal by nature which is 
based on their origin—in the fact that they all evolved through accidental natural processes. 
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Both natural right and intrinsic value have been understood mostly as moral right and 
have been  attributed to humans alone.  But as we have seen, the intrinsic value of nonhuman 
nature could be understood as aesthetic. 
Some environmental philosophers hesitate to declare that non-human natural entities 
in the environment have moral rights.  The emphasis is rather on how we, as moral agents, 
should treat them.  In his article that I have cited a number of times in the preceding chapter, 
where he argues for the intrinsic value of the (biotic, non-human) entities in the environment 
from the perspective of their having a good of their own, Paul Taylor declares that “I have not 
asserted anywhere in the foregoing account that animals or plants have moral rights…I do not 
think that the reference class of the concept, bearer of moral rights, should be extended to 
include nonhuman living things.”148 I submit that his reason is that non human nature cannot 
meet the exigencies of morality, as stated above.  Taylor also argues for the legal rights of the 
entities in the environment, as a public recognition of their intrinsic value.  Taylor arrives at 
his position through his ethics of “respect for nature” which he elaborates in his discussion of 
the intrinsic value of nature (living things), based on their having a good of their own.  His 
argument, put succinctly, is this: if humans have intrinsic value because they have a good of 
their own, other living things also have intrinsic value because they equally have a good of 
their own. It is having this good of their own that makes them equal to human beings.  I arrive 
at the same position through the ontological independence of the environment.  My argument 
is based on origin.  Both humans and all the natural entities in the environment evolved 
through accidental natural processes.  It is this common source of their origin that confers on 
them ontological independence and intrinsic value.  However, each particular kind of entity 
has its own peculiar characteristics.  As humans, we are endowed with mind which makes it 
possible for us to make autonomous choices, defend those choices and assert our intrinsic 
value.  It is also this characteristic that makes us moral agents and confers on us moral rights.  
Other entities do not have that capacity and so they are not moral agents and consequently do 
not have moral rights.  I am also arguing that moral considerability should be extended to 
include those entities.  This distinguishes the morality that involves all natural entities from 
the morality that involves only humans as moral agents.  I am therefore arguing here that way 
to do it effectively is through a legal framework.   
                                                          
148 Taylor, Paul. « The Ethics of Respect for Nature » , in Earth Ehics, Introductory   
Readings on Animal  Rights and Enviroenmental Ethics, p. 95. 
 61
 What we have in common with all the natural entities is the nature of our common 
origin.  We are all products of the same accidental natural processes.  This unique notion of 
natural rights is based on the fact that every being that has the nature in question, by the very 
virtue of having that nature, also has those rights.  An analogy might be helpful here. All 
human beings, in so far as they are human beings, have the natural rights that all human beings 
have (human rights).  Some humans have certain capacities or merits which other humans do 
not have.  Those capacities or endowments confer on them some privileges which may not be 
accessible to other humans who are devoid of such endowments.   It would be irrational to 
assert that since some humans have certain capacities or endowments, like phenomenal 
Intelligence Quotients (IQ), differences in sex and size, therefore every human should be 
subject to the responsibilities and privileges that are attached to such endowments.  It would 
also be irrational to assert that only humans with such endowments can have human rights. 
What makes us equal as humans is our common humanity, or the fact that we are humans.  
Therefore, the only condition for having such rights and privileges is to belong to the human 
family.  If, therefore, we accept that all human beings have human rights, then we can also 
accept that all natural entities, in so far as they have the same nature, that is, they are products 
of accidental natural processes, have natural rights.  As in the case of intrinsic value, the 
natural right that humans share with other non- human natural entities in the environment is 
conferred on them by their intrinsic nature which I have described above.   It is on this nature 
that the natural right I am talking of here is based.  Our peculiar endowments, as humans, 
confer on us moral rights, privileges and responsibilities which the others that are not humans 
do not share simply because they do not have those peculiar endowments.  But the fact that we 
possess such capacities should not lead us to take ourselves as superior to other natural 
entities.  This is because they also possess, in varying degrees, capacities that we do not 
possess.  So, if we are superior to them in possessing what they do not possess, they are 
equally superior to us in possessing what we do not possess. 
If we accept that we share the same particular nature with all the entities that make up 
the environment, then it remains to be seen what kind of attitude that should elicit from us.  
According to Paul Taylor, that attitude should lead to an ethics of respect for nature.  In some 
of the religions and cultures mentioned earlier, the respect accorded to the entities in the 
environment stems, not so much from their metaphysical or religious endowments as from 
 62
their very nature.  The Igboman respects the land, the plants, animals, and all other entities in 
the environment with the consciousness that he did not put them there and that they have an 
origin that is absolutely independent of him.   It is the consciousness of the independent 
coming into being and existence of these entities that led—actually misled—them to posit 
their provenance in invisible forces.    
When Buddhists ordain a tree, what they are saying in effect is that such an entity 
could be expected to behave like human priests.  The same thing is prevalent in Igbo 
traditional religion and in Hinduism where non human natural entities are falsely attributed 
with human characteristics in order to instill respect for them in humans.  But if we see our 
oneness with the rest of nature and also the limits of that oneness, then our attitude of respect 
for them should be put into proper perspective.  Our oneness with them is to be found in the 
fact that we evolved the way they did.  And the limit of that oneness is that we also have 
capacities which they do not have.  Therefore, respect or rights for them should be limited to 
what makes us one with them.  So, the natural right that we share with them is the one that is 
based on our common origin. We do not share with them the endowments that make us moral 
beings.  So, it should then follow that we cannot share moral rights with them.    The ethics of 
respect for the environment should therefore not be based on the moral rights of all the entities 
that make up the environment, as Paul Taylor has pointed out.  This is because not all natural 
entities are endowed with moral capacities.  Now, as moral agents, there is nothing wrong with 
extending moral considerability to non moral agents.  But I do not think we should assert that 
such moral considerability should be taken to mean a strict moral duty.  As moral agents, our 
primary moral concern should be other moral agents.   That is, one has responsibilities and 
also rights in the social community.  It is only in this context that we can talk of strict moral 
duty.  Now as moral agents, we cannot help but behave accordingly.  Anything short of that 
would be denying our nature.  Not only do we interact with natural entities, (as we do with 
artifacts), but we also share a certain nature with them.  So, although we do not share our 
moral nature with them, we could still respect them.  Our moral considerability for non-human 
nature is brought to bear on the fact we are moral agents.  The field of our moral behaviour is 
not made up only of moral agents.  Given this fact, it could therefore be said that we owe 
moral duties only to moral agents in the environment and moral considerability to natural, 
non-moral agents in the environment. 
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This, I think, is the attitude that most environmental philosophers adopt.  When they 
talk of duties to the environment, one can understand it as moral duty only in a very loose 
sense.  It can only be a strict moral duty if, and only if, the entities involved are all moral 
agents.  This is why I think that moral considerability could be a more appropriate 
terminology.   Kenneth Goodpaster has tried to enlarge the reach of moral considerability by 
extending it to all living beings, irrespective of seemingly common qualities like sentience and 
interest.  He distinguishes two themes: operative and regulative, as they concern moral 
considerability.  “Let us, then, say that the moral considerability of X is operative for an agent 
A if and only if the thorough acknowledgement of X is psychologically (and in general, 
causally) possible for A.  If the moral considerability of X is defensible on all grounds 
independent of operativity, we shall say that it is regulative…as far as I can see, X’s being a 
living thing is both necessary and sufficient for moral considerability so understood.”149 
Goodpaster’s point is that the moral considerability on the operative level is more restrictive 
than on the regulative level, given one’s psychological and nutritional considerations.  
However, other philosophers maintain that an adequate environmental ethics should include 
both living and non-living natural entities.  Katz is one such philosopher.  He puts his point 
thus: “An environmental ethic that is true to the principles of environmentalism must be able 
to explain the moral consideration of nonliving natural entities as well as living ones.  An 
environmental ethic that considers the moral worth of all natural entities is considering rocks, 
bodies of water, and shifting sands of a beach to be morally considerable.”150 Katz thinks that 
such an ethic could be based on ecosystemic well being.  The problem with it is that if a 
particular natural entity is given consideration solely on the grounds of its role in the 
ecosystem, what happens when it can be easily replaced by a simulated version of itself or 
when its role is no longer needed for the proper functioning of the ecosystem?  Katz realizes 
this difficulty.  His solution is that entities could also be considered individually as having a 
good of their own.  He had in mind “…the rare endangered species that is no longer a 
functioning part of the natural ecosystem, or even disease organisms such as the smallpox 
virus that are on the verge of being totally eradicated.”151 I think the solution I propose offers a 
better prospect.  If we base our respect for all the natural entities on the common origin we 
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have with them, then the role they play or do not play would no longer be a deciding factor.  
This also solves the problem of equating intrinsic function with intrinsic value, as I have 
already mentioned. 
Rolston, for all his insistence on the intrinsic value of nature, does not present non-
human nature as moral agents.  For him it is only human beings who are moral agents and who 
should therefore have a moral approach to the rest of nature.  He finds this approach typified 
in John Rodman’s commentary on Leopold’s “Land Ethic”:   
We can simply abstract from the last part of this carefully composed book the notion of 
extending ethics to the land and its inhabitants.  The land ethic emerges in the course of 
the book as an integral part of a sensibility developed through observation, participatory 
experience, and reflection.  It is an “ethic” in the almost forgotten sense of “a way of life”.  
For this reason it would be pretentious to talk of a land ethic until we have let our 
curiosity follow the skunk as it emerges from hibernation, listened with wonder at the 
calls of the wild geese arriving at the pond, saved the fallen ancient tree while meditating 
its history, shot a wolf (once) and looked into its eyes as it died, recognized the fish in 
ourselves, and strained to see the world from the perspective of a muskrat eye—deep in 
the swamp only to realize that in the end the mind of the muskrat holds for us a mystery 
that we cannot fathom.152
 
What is important to note here is that ethics is presented in its “almost forgotten sense 
of ‘a way of life.’”  What this type of ethics does is to allow us to see our place in nature and 
also to understand all the other natural entities and the processes they go through without 
reading extraterrestrial, or even moral meanings into them. 
Callicott, for his part, also thinks that the intrinsic value of non-human nature does not 
translate into moral value.  This is because, according to him, non-human nature cannot 
reciprocate our moral gestures.  How then do we treat these entities?  Callicott finds the 
answer in the Judeo-Christian stewardship interpretation of environmental ethics: “Surely 
tigers and other predators are not immoral beasts.  And it is patently absurd to think that 
human parasites and disease-causing organisms ought (in the ethical sense) not to afflict 
mankind; or that natural calamities—like tsunamis and earthquakes—are moral evils.  
Happily, in the Judeo-Christian stewardship environmental ethic, man’s uniqueness among 
other creatures—his creation in the image of God—results in a moral asymmetry that cuts 
through this conundrum.  We are uniquely privileged, and uniquely responsible.”153  
Callicott’s point is that nature is amoral and that only human beings are moral.  This morality 
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flows directly from the concept of God as the moral ruler of the world.  The human being who 
is made in the image of God is first God’s moral subject and consequently the moral caretaker 
of the world. 
But Callicot also acknowledges that one has to believe in such a God for the ethic to 
be effective.  Nonetheless, he has his doubts: “…one must, in other words, believe that a 
transcendent, personal God exists in fact as well as story; that the natural environment was 
created pretty much as described in the Bible, and so on.  Taken literally, these larger 
propositions are, to say the least, dubious.”154  
It might be useful here to remark that Spinoza, in his Ethics, thinks that taking the will 
of God as the cause of things is ignorance.  He calls it the “asylum of ignorance.”155 This, I 
believe, supports the argument that the respect the religions and cultures discussed in Chapter 
One accord to the environment, a respect based on the belief that it is created by God, is 
misleading.   Spinoza’s emphasis is on the knowledge of the true nature of the environment.  
The desire to do good is based on another desire which is to understand.  It is this 
understanding that leads to true knowledge.156 This knowledge is what informs his 
environmental ethics.  According to Naess, the following scenario makes Spinoza’s 
environmental ethics perspicacious:  
What might a Spinozist say about contemporary human policy towards nature?  He would 
use fairly strong words: It is acting from ignorance, not from knowledge of the intimate 
bonds between all living and non-living beings.  Further, it is not genuinely acting, it is 
succumbing to passive effects (These are, among others: hope, fear, despair, pity, humility 
[from weakness], cowardice, indignation, contempt, disparagement, aversion, hatred, 
envy, cruelty, dejection, pride, luxury, avarice).157
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In the preceding chapter, I argued that the intrinsic value of the environment is not 
moral but aesthetic.  In this chapter I have also argued that the right of the environment is not 
moral but natural.  In the following sections I discuss first the aesthetic value and the land 
ethic and then the legal rights of the entities in the environment and explore the implications of 
these for environmental ethics.   
 
III. AESTHETIC VALUE AND THE LAND ETHIC 
In his aesthetics, Kant distinguishes between judgments of taste and judgments of 
sense.  According to Coleman, this in a way seems to be akin to the distinction between de 
jure and de facto.158 For Kant, the judgment of taste (de jure) must be universalizable so that 
everybody can have an obligation to agree to the judgment. The universal agreement will be a 
proof that the judgment of taste responds to common sense.  Kant makes the point thus:  
 
In all judgment by which we declare something to be beautiful, we allow no one to be of a 
different opinion, without, however, grounding our judgment on concepts, but only on our 
feeling, which we therefore make our ground not as private feeling, but as a common one.  
Now this common sense cannot be grounded on experience for this purpose, for it is to 
justify judgment that contain a ‘should’: it does not say that everyone will concur with our 
judgment but that everyone should agree with it.159  
 
Coleman, I think, aptly captures the point Kant is making here. According to him, 
“Kant seems to be claiming that just as the law must hold for everyone and self-exception 
must be ruled out, genuine aesthetic judgment requires putting oneself into the position of any 
rational and sensuous being like ourselves.”160 So, if as rational beings, we judge nature to be 
beautiful, we can expect all rational beings to agree with our judgment.  In this demanding of 
agreement, our feelings are no longer private, as Kant remarked.  One’s private feelings can 
lead one to love nature, but not everyone should be expected to have those same feelings.  As 
rational beings, what is demanded of us is not love for everybody but rather respect for every 
individual person.  Conversely, if our aesthetic judgment should lead to an ethics of respect for 
nature, then it must be shown that such judgment is valid for all rational beings, irrespective of 
their private dispositions to the objects in the environment.  According to Paul Taylor, “To put 
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it in a Kantian way, to adopt the attitude of respect for nature is to take a stance that one wills 
it to be a universal law for all rational beings.  It is to hold that stance categorically, as being 
validly applicable to every moral agent without exception, irrespective of whatever personal 
feelings toward nature such an agent might have or lack.”161 The respect for nature, which we 
demand of ourselves as moral agents, is based, not on the moral rights of non-human nature, 
but rather from our understanding of our place in nature. 
In his criticism of Rolston’s notion of the intrinsic value of the environment, Rollin 
posits that the moral value of the environment could well be based on its aesthetic value.  “Our 
legal system has, for example”, argues Rollin, “valuable and irreplaceable property laws that 
forbid owners of aesthetic objects…to destroy them at will...Moral status also would arise 
from the fact that humans have an aesthetic concern in not letting a unique and irreplaceable 
aesthetic object (or group of objects) disappear forever from our umwelt (environment).”162 
The point Rollin has made, which is well taken, is that the aesthetic value of something can 
indeed confer on it enforceable legal rights, as his example shows.  Rolston asks, “How to 
couple aesthetics with ethics?  Easily…logically, one ought not to destroy beauty; 
psychologically, one does not wish to destroy beauty.”163  By appealing to psychological and 
logical factors, Rolston thinks, in what I take to be a plausible interpretation of Kantian natural 
aesthetics, that in the face of the beauty of the environment, we make demands on ourselves as 
rational beings.  
Rollin criticized what he terms Rolston’s notion that there is moral value in the 
environment.  As pointed out earlier, Rolston does not argue that the environment is a moral 
agent, or that it has an intrinsic moral value in classical sense of the term moral.  Rolston’s aim 
is that we should have an ethic of the environment; or an extension of moral considerability to 
the non-human natural entities in the environment.   In this sense then, Rollin’s criticism of 
Rolston is misplaced.  Proposing that we have moral regard for the environment does not 
translate into saying that the entities in the environment should be treated as moral beings, in 
the sense of being agents.  Rollin himself, as the above quotation from him shows, thinks that 
the moral value, or more precisely, the ethics of artifacts could be established from the 
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aesthetic point of view.   But to do this, Rollin notes that the role played by the legal system is 
crucial in protecting the aesthetic cum ethical value of artifacts—an object is found to be of a 
very high aesthetic value and a law protecting that value is accordingly enacted.  The purpose 
of the law is to ensure that everyone agrees—or more precisely, should agree—to that 
judgment. If the object Rollin spoke about is a natural object, then it would respond well to 
what Kant calls the universal validity of aesthetic judgment.   It has nothing as such to do with 
whether the entity in question has moral right or value.  The object in question, as in Rollin’s 
example, is itself oblivious—because unconscious—of all the fuss human beings are making 
about it.  As I pointed out earlier, granting them legal rights is a way of publicly 
acknowledging their intrinsic value.  According to Taylor, “There is no reason…why plants 
and animals, including whole species populations and life communities, cannot be accorded 
legal rights under my theory.  To grant them legal protection could be interpreted as giving 
them legal entitlement to be protected, and this, in fact, would be a means by which a society 
that subscribed to the ethics of respect for nature could give public recognition to their 
inherent worth.”164 I think it is important to point out here that I have no particular problem 
with laws being made, as in Rollin’s example, to protect artifacts.  Most of the time that is 
what the law does.  Such artifacts could be shown to have spiritual, aesthetic or commercial 
values.  But what this thesis is arguing for is the legal right of the environment, based on its 
intrinsic value.  Rollin’s example can only be understood as having an analogical import here.  
If some artifacts are judged as having the kind of aesthetic value that requires a legal 
protection, all the more do natural entities which have been shown to have intrinsic aesthetic 
value.  This is why Paul Taylor, although his approach is not aesthetic, thinks that the legal 
rights of natural entities (in this case all living things) should be based on their intrinsic value. 
In his “Land Ethic”, Aldo Leopold proposed that there should be some obligation on 
the part of human beings toward what he called the land—which for him meant the 
environment as a whole.  “There is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to the land and 
to the animals and plants which grow upon it.  Land, like Odysseus’s slave girls, is still 
property.  The land elation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not 
obligations.”165 The obligation Leopold had in mind is what he called ethic which for him 
meant limitation.  “An ethic, ecologically,” declared Leopold, “is a limitation on freedom of 
                                                          
164 Taylor, Paul. op.cit., p. 108. 
165 Aldo, Leopold. op. cit.,p. 218. 
 69
action in the struggle for existence.”166 I understand such limitation to imply a legal 
framework.    
 
IV. “SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?” 
It is this type of legal framework that Christopher Stone was proposing in his book, 
Should Trees have Standing? Stone calls his proposal the “Unthinkable”.  According to him, 
the earliest families, like extended kinship groups and clans were not concerned about other 
groups and clans external to one’s own.  Outside such groups there were people who were 
devoid of rights, e.g. children and the aged, prisoners, aliens, women, the insane, Blacks, 
fetuses and Indians.167  The unthinkable occurs when sympathy is extended to other families 
and people of all races, when one is interested not only in their welfare but also in their 
happiness.  This kind of regard extends to lower animals.  The issue of corporations and states 
being legal entities was also a long way in becoming a reality too.  As Stone notes, “each 
successive extension of rights to some new entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable.”168 
When rights were denied to Blacks, Chinese, women, it was thought that it had been so 
decreed by nature and therefore nothing was wrong with the denial.  Now we think otherwise! 
Stone wants to add to the list of the unthinkables that became thinkable.  “I am quite 
seriously proposing that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so called 
‘natural objects’ in the environment as a whole.”169 But he points out that rights to the 
environment have to be qualified, proportionately, first in regard to human rights and 
secondly, in regard to other objects in the environment.  Therefore there are two sets of aspects 
involved in the granting of rights to the environment.  One is “the legal-operational aspects”, 
and the other is the “psychic and socio-psychological aspects.”170
 Stone presents two comparative societies—S1 and S2.  In S1, the master of a slave 
or the mother of a live-born baby sues for damages from one who has injured his slave or child 
while in S2 the slave himself institutes the legal action or the child files a suit in its own name.  
The point is that in S2, both the slave and the child are holders of legal rights.   
                                                          
166 Ibid, p.217-218. 
167 Stone, Christopher D. Should Trees have Standing?, p. 2. 
168 Ibid, p.3. 
169 Ibid, p.6.  
170 Ibid, p.7. 
 70
 In common law the environment is like the slave and the fetus in S1, that is, without 
legal rights. Stone dismisses the assertion that natural objects like forests have no rights 
because they cannot speak. “Corporations cannot speak either, nor can states, estates, infants, 
incompetents, municipalities or universities.  Lawyers speak for them.”171 So, as Stone 
proposes, a friend of a natural object (like Friends of the Earth) can speak for it, as its 
guardian.  Stone notes with relief that some progress is being made in this direction.  
 Since, in common law, the environment has no legal rights, like the slave and the 
fetus in S1, harm done to the environment had been first regarded as causing hardship to 
human beings or the human society and then indirectly as affecting the environment itself.  
Stone is suggesting that we should first see it as harm done directly to the environment.  The 
objects that suffer these damages may not have monetary values or be edible to humans.  
“…the death of eagles and inedible crabs, the suffering of sea lions, the loss from the face of 
the earth of species of commercially valueless birds, the disappearance of a wilderness 
area.”172  Stone notes that there have been notable shifts in the notion that nature exists for 
humankind.  The emphasis now includes how human beings and nature can exist 
harmoniously.  “Because the health and well-being of mankind depend upon the health and 
well-being of the environment, these goals will often be so mutually supportive that one can 
avoid deciding whether our rationale is to advance “us” or a new “us” that includes the 
environment.”173 Some harmful products now carry warnings not only for humans but also for 
animals and plants.  But Stone insists that the environmental protectionists should be less 
utilitarian in their approach.  Our notion that man dominates Nature, which has its basis in 
some religious philosophical traditions, has to be revisited, Stone insists. 
What Stone is advocating, as I understand it, is simply an extension of morality to the 
non-human world.  However, it does not seem very clear whether what he is proposing is 
moral considerability or a strict moral duty.   We need to keep in mind that natural processes 
are amoral.  Morality has been presented in this work as the way humans try to order and 
regulate affairs that concern them alone.  Stone seems to have realized this, and so he 
advocates that human beings should stand in the place of these entities, as in S1. The reason 
for this move does not seem clear, except that it enables him to talk of the “property 
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interests”174 of these non human natural entities.  But can they really be said to have property, 
in the human sense of the term?  In S2, it can be said that there is a certain degree of initiative 
on the part of the slave and the child so that they are not totally oblivious of what is going on 
as in S1.  That is why they can “institute” a legal action in their own names.  In S1, the slave 
and fetus can be said to be totally oblivious of what is going on in their names.  So, the 
environment cannot be plausibly said to be like the slave and the child in S2. Also, his analogy 
of the environment being like corporations could be quite misleading.  This is because such 
entities are formed by people to pursue their interests while the environment is not.  In other 
words, the corporations are artificial while the environment is not.  They cannot be said to 
exist independently of the humans who create and run them.  So, while conceding that what 
Stone has to say is admirable, I still find it difficult to follow his argument that since we have 
done this for other hitherto excluded classes of people, we should do the same for all the 
entities in the environment.   In both the protection of natural entities and in sanctioning them, 
as when a river overflows and destroys plants, animals and landscapes, it is the human being 
who takes the initiative and decides which action to take.  It is the human being who decides 
what is wrong or right. Unfortunately, Stone acknowledges this problem but did not give much 
thought to its implications for what he is proposing.  His solution is that trust funds should be 
set up in the name of natural objects like rivers and such funds should be used in cases where 
the river damages other entities.  But on the question of responsibility, he acknowledges the 
problem that arises thereby but offers no solution. It could be argued that responsibility in this 
sense should be understood, not as moral responsibility, but as a result of natural processes.  
What type of responsibility was he talking about?  He certainly gives the impression that he is 
talking of moral responsibility. “The ontological problem would be troublesome here, 
however, when the Nile overflows, is it the “responsibility” of the river? the mountain, the 
snow? the hydrologic cycle?..”175 Can the river be said to be responsible for being and 
“acting” the way it does?  If the answer is yes, then that responsibility could be a moral one.  
Using responsibility here in the second sense may be quite misleading or seems rather 
awkward.  What place does responsibility have in a process that is purely accidental?  Do we 
need to attribute human categories to the non human world in order to a respect for them?  
When we say that we need to have respect for them, we address, not these entities, but 
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humans.  So, should we talk of responsibility at all in this context?  Could amoral entities be 
held “responsible” for their “actions”?  Such responsibility means for Stone that a judgment 
could be delivered against a non-human entity in the environment.  Such an entity could 
therefore be made to bear liabilities.  “Incidentally, if ‘rights are to be granted to the 
environment, then for many of the same reasons it might bear ‘liabilities’ as well—as 
inanimate objects did anciently.  Rivers drown people, and flood over and destroy crops; 
forests burn, setting fire to contiguous communities.  Where trust funds had been established, 
they could be available for the satisfaction of judgments against the environment, making it 
bear the costs of some of the harms it imposes on other right holders.”176   I am not against 
setting up funds in the name of some non-human natural entities.  But such funds should be set 
up, based on our understanding of certain possibilities which the existence of such entities 
could bring.  And yes, we could use such funds to clean up and remedy after the river 
overflows and damages things or other natural disasters occur.  Such funds could also be used 
to clean up the river after a pollution that could be as a result of uncontrollable natural 
processes, like the eruption of a volcano or as a result of an inevitable pollution by humans, as 
Stone himself notes. But when we take such actions, what should inform them should be our 
ethics of respect for nature.  And where such a respect is lacking, legal action should be 
brought against the perpetrators.   
It is in this context of respect for nature that I must say that I agree with Stone that 
natural entities should be given legal consideration.  But this does not need to be done in the 
context of moral rights.  Rather, it should be done in the context of natural rights, that is, in the 
awareness that we share a certain kind of nature and intrinsic value with natural, non-human 
entities in the environment.   
This is why I find the approach advanced by Warwick Fox in his idea of the burden of 
proof quite appropriate in this context.  Fox has argued that the fact that something has 
intrinsic value does not mean that it should not be tampered with.  
The claim that nature has intrinsic value, that it is valuable in and of itself—if true, puts 
the burden of proof on those who would interfere with, manipulate or exploit it…As Fox 
points out, to claim that something is intrinsically valuable does not mean that it can never 
be interfered with under any circumstances.  Human beings are generally accepted as 
having intrinsic value, but in certain circumstances it is morally legitimate to imprison, put 
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at risk, perhaps even kill, some of them.  But if we are to justify such treatment, sufficient 
justification must be given.177
 
This is akin to what Arthur Ripstein, following John Rawls, calls the “reasonableness 
test”.  There is, according to him, a public, objective standard of reasonableness.  While the 
rational person acts exclusively in the pursuit of his or her ends, the reasonable, or 
representative person is one who takes appropriate precautions against injuring others, makes 
only allowable mistakes, and maintains an appropriate level of self control when provoked.178  
Ripstein’s target is human interaction but his theory is basically the same as Fox’s burden of 
proof.  It is what should inform our attitude to the environment. 
Hargrove was fulfilling the burden of proof when he remarked that wildlife could 
coexist with sport and subsistent.179  
I pointed out earlier that all the entities in the environment affect other entities directly 
or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, through their actions, inactions, or simply their 
mere presence.  But the case of human beings is quite peculiar.  The lioness that pounces on a 
prey animal does that for food.  If she attacks, it would be in self defense, or in defense of her 
cubs.  Her actions certainly infringe on the natural rights of other entities.  But apparently they 
are justifiable.  The same cannot be said of many human actions.  The point is that no animal 
kills another animal except in response to a natural necessity like hunger and protection of the 
young.  It would be very rare, if not impossible, to see an animal that kills a prey simply with 
“tomorrow” in mind, or out of hatred or such other vagaries. 
Arne Naess was in a way responding to this burden of proof when he spoke of how 
conscious he was of the way he was treating the plant salix harbacea during his stay in the 
mountains.   
I have injured thousands of the little arctic plant salix harbacea during nine years of 
accumulative stay in the mountains, and I shall continue to step on them as long as I live.  
But I have never felt the need to justify such behavior by thinking that they have less right 
to live and blossom, or less intrinsic value as living beings, than certain other living 
beings, including myself.  It is simply not possible to live in certain mountains without 
stepping on these plants, and I maintain that it is justifiable to live there.  When I behave 
as I do I can at the same time admire these plants, acknowledge their equal right to live 
and blossom with my right.180  
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 This is the type of attitude, as mentioned in Chapter One, that the traditional Igboman 
has towards the animals he slaughters for food by speaking to them, explaining that he is not 
doing it out of hatred and disdain.  It is also this attitude that he has when he digs the lands, 
clears the forest, builds a bridge, fells a tree, builds roads, etc.  These actions are governed by 
a body of laws known as taboos.  It is also this type of attitude that informs the Buddha’s tacit 
approval to the killing of animals for food, the tilling of the soil for cropping, the felling of 
trees for construction, etc.  Even those in the Chipko movement would readily agree that trees 
should be felled to provide wood for fuel and construction, etc.  In his “Land Ethic”, Leopold 
condoned the killing of animals in hunting and other “prudent” uses of the environment.  And 
as the citation from him at the beginning of this chapter makes clear, his ethic does not 
condemn the use of the entities in the environment.  According to Callicot, “Aldo 
Leopold…did not even condemn hunting animals, let alone eating them, nor did he personally 
abandon hunting, for which he had had an enthusiasm since boyhood, upon becoming 
convinced that his ethical responsibilities extended beyond the human sphere.”181 These 
attitudes are the naturally necessary response to the exigencies of survival.  Similarly, in 
Spinoza’s ethical system, he found nothing wrong with human beings appropriating natural 
resources for their own good.  This is because, according to him, every being endeavours to 
persist in its own being.182 And given that human beings have certain natural characteristics 
that other natural entities do not have, they will use those characteristics to preserve their 
being.   
In the state of nature every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in other 
words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his power as it had been 
conditioned.  Now it is the sovereign law and right of nature that each individual should 
endeavor to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything but itself; therefore this 
sovereign law and right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according to 
its natural conditions.183   
 
However, this has to be understood in the context of the knowledge of the 
interconnectivity of all things; or environmental enlightenment.  According to Lloyd, 
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“Spinoza’s acquiescence in the exploitation of other species has…a very different basis from 
this anthropocentric perception of the world which he categorically condemns…We are more 
perfect than animals: that is, we are capable of a wider range of activities.  It is not that he sees 
this as justification of our having ‘more rights over them than they should have over us’.  To 
be more perfect is just to be more active, to have more power.  And virtue is just doing what 
enhances our activity.”184 The point being made here is that the fact that we have some 
peculiar characteristics does not make us superior to other natural entities in the environment.  
Those entities also have characteristics which, given the way we evolved, we do not have.  In 
that sense they can also be said to have more power over us.  Every natural entity therefore 
perseveres in its being, given its particular natural characteristics.  So, persevering or 
persisting in our being or essence, in Spinoza’s system, does not mean, as Naess points out, 
that we do not take into consideration the well being of other entities in the environment.  
 In order to persevere in their essence, people sometimes do things for the sake of others, 
even for the sake of valleys and landscapes.  The terminology of Supreme Court Judge 
Douglas is well understood.  It reveals that the nature or essence of humans may comprise 
and encompass more than their present policies towards nature attest to.  Spinoza’s view 
of the closeness of each to all is, incidentally, stressed in a new way by Spinoza’s 
‘physics’…the treatment there of individuality demands essentially an integration between 
the individual and its surrounding totality of being.185   
 
The Supreme Court case referred to by Naess is the one mentioned by Stone where 
the Justice of the Court declared that the case before him should be “labeled as Mineral King 
V. Morton”.  What led up to this declaration is that “That U.S. Forest Service had granted a 
permit to Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc. to ‘develop’ Mineral King Valley, a wilderness area in 
California’s Sierra Nevada Mountains, by construction of a $35 million complex of motels, 
restaurant, and recreational facilities.  The Sierra Club, maintaining that the project would 
adversely affect the area’s esthetic and ecological balance, brought suit for an injunction.”186 
The Walt Disney Enterprises argued that the Sierra club had no standing in the matter since it 
could not claim to have been aggrieved.  The case went all the way to the Supreme Court and 
Justice Douglas made his famous declaration: 
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The critical question of ‘standing’ would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if 
we…allowed environmental issues to be litigated in the name of the inanimate object 
about to be despoiled, defaced or invaded…contemporary public concern for protecting 
nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon 
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.  See Should Tree have 
Standing?...This suit would therefore be more properly labeled as Mineral King V. 
Morton.187   
 
This reminds one of the conflict between the Chipko movement and the Indian 
Forestry Department mentioned in chapter one. What is important is that these cases manifest 
the level of environmental consciousness of the societies involved. 
Andrew Brennan cites Chief Seattle who is attributed with giving the following 
outline of the rich environmental ethics of the Indians that is imbued with the type of 
consciousness being advocated here:  
Our dead never forget this beautiful earth, for it is the mother of the red man.  We are part 
of the earth and it is part of us.  The perfumed flowers are our sisters; the deer, the horse, 
the great eagle; these are our brothers.  The rocky crests, the juices of the meadow, the 
body heat of the pony, and man—all belong to the same family…the rivers are our 
brothers, they quench our thirst.  The rivers carry our canoes, and feed our children.  If we 
sell you our land, you must remember, and teach your children, that the rivers are our 
brothers, and yours, and you must henceforth give the rivers the kindness you would give 
any brother…188
 
But there are times when inevitable conflicts will develop in our environment which 
requires that we have to choose to destroy one entity in favor of the others.  But I think the 
burden of proof and the reasonableness test could adequately handle that.  This would be the 
case in what Emily Brady wonders should be done to a plant that is poisons to animals and 
other plants.  “Rhododendron ponticum is toxic to mammals and, in addition to the dense 
shade it creates, its roots release poison into the soil which kills most plant and insect life.  In 
Wales’s Snowdonia National Park, eradicating this species is a conservation aim in order to 
protect native ecology, and also, undoubtedly, in an attempt to keep the park wild…”189 This is 
clearly a case where a natural entity is to be eradicated because of its adverse effects on other 
entities.  The intrinsic value of the plant is not in question.  What is in question is its effects on 
other members of the ecological community.  This would tally with Fox’s burden of proof.  
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There are societies where capital punishment is practiced.  In all human societies, people are 
routinely separated from the rest of the society and put in prison because of their adverse 
effects on others.  In some cases these actions are easily justified, in others, they are not. 
In the traditional Igbo culture some human beings were sacrificed to appease the gods, 
some were even buried alive to accompany the corpse of a prominent personality in order to 
serve him in the hereafter, and twins were cruelly killed as soon as they were born because 
their birth was seen as an aberration of the natural processes.  Slavery is still being practiced 
around the world, albeit in forms that are different from the trans-Atlantic slave trade.  In the 
Bible, St. Paul admonishes slaves to be obedient to their masters.  There are cultures that still 
practice infanticide and senicide.  In Plato’s Republic, he advocated infanticide on the basis 
that such children are born without the sanction of the state.  His prescription was that men 
and women should only have children at the allowed ages and with the allowed mates.  After 
that age, they should no longer legally beget children.  If they do, then it shall be seen that 
“...no child, if any be conceived, shall be brought to light, or if they cannot prevent its birth, to 
dispose of it on the understanding that no such child can be reared.”190 These actions can only 
be justified on the grounds of religious and abstract laws that betray a warped understanding 
of the environment, including human beings, as having no real value of their own.  Curiously, 
in the Igbo traditional culture, one sometimes notices respect for other entities in the 
environment to the detriment of humans.  Earth and the rivers, for instance, were entities to 
which human beings were sometimes sacrificed.  Of course such sacrifices were carried out in 
the names of the gods or goddesses that such entities represented.  One sometimes sees large 
trees and bushes standing in the middle of the road because they “refused” to be cut down 
during construction.  Such things obstruct the free flow of traffic and sometimes lead to fatal 
accidents.  This is somehow similar to Rolston saying that humans be shot to save an 
endangered species of plant.  “On San Clemente Island, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and 
the California Department of Fish and Game asked the Navy to shoot 2000 feral goats to save 
three endangered plant species, malacothamus clementinus, Castilleja grisea, and Delphinium 
kinkiense.  That would kill several goats for each known surviving plant.  (Happily, the Fund 
for Animals rescued most of the goats; unhappily they could not trap them all and the issue is 
unresolved.)  The National Park did kill hundreds of rabbits on Santa Barbara Island to protect 
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a few plants of Dudleya traskiae, once thought extinct and curiously called Santa Barbara live-
forever.”191    Rollin raised the issue of the San Clemente Island and asked Rolston what he 
would suggest if human beings, instead of goats, were involved.  “…I asked him to imagine an 
imaginary case, one in which the endangered plant was threatened not by animals but by 
teenage trail bikers who persisted in driving over it. ‘Shoot them as well’, he replied 
instantly.”192 I think situations like these should call for deliberation and not just instant 
answers like the one Rolston gave.  I have in mind the type of deliberations that go on in the 
courts, like the one Stone advocates.  Humans should be the ones to decide what to do at the 
end.  But such decisions should be made without taking the natural entities as moral beings or 
simply seeing them as instruments to maximize human welfare.  It should be the type of 
decisions cultures that engage in infanticide and senicide have to make.  Respect for the 
entities on whom decisions are being made should be paramount in the decision making 
process.  I think that initially, both farming and hunting involved these types of decisions. 
A viable environmental ethic could and indeed did accommodate interfering with 
human life and comfort as Callicott points out, talking of primitive peoples: “…population 
was routinely optimized by sexual continency, abortion, infanticide, and stylized warfare.”193  
But the infanticide Plato proposed, and the one practiced in Igbo traditional culture do not 
respond well to what Spinoza calls an exigency of the instinct of preservation but rather were 
meant to satisfy an abstract law or an abstract god.  In this sense they are clearly abuses of the 
natural rights of infants and such abuses cannot pass the reasonableness test.  Nor can they 
bear the Foxian burden of proof.  They are, according to Callicott, an imposition of “artificial 
legalities, rights, and so on, on nature.”194 Most of the activities of multinational companies 
that unscrupulously pollute and degrade the environment around the world, with their eyes 
myopically fixed on pecuniary advantages cannot bear this burden of proof.   
What is crucial in our appropriation of other entities in the environment is that we 
should do it with an enlightened and highlighted environmental consciousness, as Spinoza, 
Leopold, Naess, Rolston, etc, have been advocating.  And that means that, not only are we part 
of nature, but also that these entities have intrinsic value. What this entails is that we need to 
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have a kind of regard for them.  This kind of regard could be incorporated into an ethics of 
respect for the environment.  It is this type of ethics that would help us address the 
environmental crisis we are facing now. 
  In a rather hastily reasoned argument, Narveson claims that there is no 
environmental problem at present.  He asserts that “People in Los Angeles, with all of its smog 
and even with its panoply of social problems, are much better off now than the band of natives 
who occupied the area five centuries earlier, despite the complete absence of smog (may be—
for we don’t know how many wood fires they burned!).”195 Until I gain a different 
understanding of Narveson’s position, I fail to see the connection between the smog and being 
better off.  I also do not see how the wood smoke in Indian villages compares with the smog in 
a heavily industrialized society like Los Angeles.  Nor do I agree that a group of people living 
in this millennium could lay claim to being better off than those who came before them in the 
preceding millennia simply because of the gadgets they have been able to produce, coupled 
with their consumerism.  I also wonder if the smog is not too high a price to pay for being 
“better off”.  As for the band of natives, those of them who still survive in scattered 
settlements are indeed “worse off” because of their forceful separation from their way of life, a 
way of life that has harmony with the entities in the environment as an intrinsic part.  
According to Arne Naess, “Industrial people interfere so severely with the natural processes 
that even a very small number of them can significantly alter the landscape…It is not possible 
for people living in the United States to interfere as little with the wilderness as did the 
traditional American Indian.”196 If there is no environmental crisis at present, caused chiefly 
by humans, how do we explain phenomena like the greenhouse, depletion of the ozone layer 
and global warming, etc?  How do we explain what Castro expressed as “…Millions of tons of 
chlorofluorocarbons advancing toward the ozone layer, more and more millions of carbon 
dioxide, millions, hundreds of million, billions of tons of this gas…”197 that are emitted to the 
atmosphere on a yearly basis?  In my native land multinational oil companies have been 
flaring gases for over five decades.  They claim that it is the only way they can profitably get 
rid of their gaseous by-products.  The profit they are generating may be making some people 
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“better off”.  But whoever those people are, they certainly are not those living in those oil 
producing communities.  On the contrary, what they (people living in those areas) experience 
is what Ken Saro-Wiwa calls “…a blighted countryside…atmosphere full of carbon dioxide, 
carbon monoxide, and hydrocarbons; a land in which wildlife is unknown; a land of polluted 
streams and creeks, of rivers without fish, a land which is, in every sense of the term, an 
ecological disaster.”198
 The question then, for any group in its environmental ethics, is not whether it can live 
with it in the short term, that is, get away with it, but whether such ethic is indeed viable in the 
long term.  This is where I find the comparison between the environments in an Indian village 
with that in a city like Los Angeles rather appalling.   People living in Los Angeles may be 
“better off” in terms of technological advancement but certainly not in their environmental 
consciousness as compared to how the Natives saw the environment.   As we have seen in the 
citation attributed Chief Seattle, their societies have a viable environmental ethics which 
stands in sharp contrast to contemporary—destructive—practices.   As Callicott points out, 
such ethic ensured that such societies had subsisted the longest in the history of our species, 
and is therefore worthy of emulation.  “It is impossible today to return to the symbiotic 
relationship of Stone Age man to the natural environment, but the ethos of this by far the 
longest era of human existence could be abstracted and integrated with a future human culture 
seeking a viable and mutually beneficial relationship with nature.”199 For this ethic to be 
effective, it has to be backed up with a legal framework as we have seen in Stone, otherwise it 
would be as ineffective as that of the Igbo environmental ethic that had only a religious 
framework.  Such a legal framework would have terms like “ecocriminality”, “ecocide”, etc, 
as currency.  This must also include—as it already does, but must do more effectively—what 
Fidel Castro calls “…international agreement aimed at preserving nature based on a universal 
sense of the common heritage of humanity.”200 I take it that the heritage he is speaking of be 
informed by a proper understanding of the environment and our place in it. 
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CONCLUSION 
“Can aesthetics be an adequate foundation 
for an environmental ethic?  This depends on 
how deep your aesthetics goes.”201
 
The argument in this thesis has been for the natural and legal rights of the 
environment, and that we humans should have an ethics of respect for the other natural entities 
in the environment.  These rights and this ethics are based on the ontological independence of 
the environment, on which in turn is based its intrinsic aesthetic value.  I believe I have 
established this ontological independence from the fact that the environment is not willfully 
created but is rather a product of accidental natural processes. 
 If we accept that natural right is a right an entity possesses by virtue of its nature, as 
in the case of human rights, then we can also, in the same vein, talk of the natural right of all 
the entities that make up the environment.  Every human being has a common nature that 
he/she shares with every human.  It is on this nature that natural human right is based.  What 
the other natural entities in the environment have in common with humans is a common 
origin.  They all evolved as a result of accidental natural processes.  So, if humans have 
natural rights based on that origin, so do all the entities that have the same origin.  Intrinsic 
value has also been established on that same nature.  This, as I argued, is because since their 
origin is accidental, natural entities cannot be said to have been created for any original 
purpose.  Their value can therefore not be said to be just instrumental.  If as humans we have 
intrinsic value due to our nature, natural entities who share in that nature also share in that 
intrinsic value.  I have also argued that whereas the intrinsic value of humans can be said to be 
moral, that of non-human natural entities are not.  This is because the peculiar characteristics 
we have that make us moral agents are lacking in those other entities. 
Since, therefore, the intrinsic value of non-human nature is not moral; my argument 
has been that it is aesthetic.  If we grant that our appreciation of nature should be conceptless, 
as Kant argued, then it means that we do not determine a priori what is before us but rather 
allow nature to “speak” to us.  The role ontological independence and intrinsic value play in 
our appreciation of nature is crucial.  Whereas artifacts are made with a purpose in the mind of 
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their creators, natural entities have no such purpose.  Our appreciation of them should 
therefore be disinterested.  It is on such disinterested appreciation that an environmental ethic 
can be based.  Kant argued that although our appreciation of nature is subjective, and 
conceptless, it can lay claim to universal validity.  Kant’s argument, which is worth reeating 
here, is that the judgment through which something is declared to be beautiful is the one that is 
grounded, not on a private feeling, but on a common one.  If it is grounded on a common 
feeling, then, as Kant claims, we can no longer say that everybody will agree with it.  What we 
say then is that everybody should agree with it.  For Kant, what we have in common, as 
human beings, is our reason.  So, the judgment we make about the beauty of the environment 
is a rational one to which every rational person should agree.  One could therefore will that 
such a judgment could be made into a universal law, valid for all rational beings. 
So if one says that we should adopt an ethics of respect for nature and such a person is 
asked why that should be the case, he would reply that it is because nature is beautiful.  He 
would argue that the judgment that nature is beautiful is not a private one, based on private 
experiences, but rather a rational one, to which every rational being should agree.  We may not 
find a particular artifact beautiful, or evoking sadness, even though its creator has made it with 
such a concept in mind.  This is because one could argue that the reason why the creator made 
the artifact with such a concept could be attributed to his personal experiences. But when it 
comes to nature, since it is not made with any concept in mind, and therefore should not be 
appreciated with any concept in mind, the judgment on its beauty should have a universal 
validity since its appreciation is disinterested. 
It is a fact, of course, that not all humans have been able to agree to the judgment that 
nature is beautiful.  This is a difficulty that could be said to be inherent in the aesthetic 
approach to environmental ethics.  An example is the difference between the ways people 
from the Judeo-Christian tradition and those imbued with an approach to the environment that 
emphasizes our oneness with all the natural entities, people represented by individuals like the 
Crocodile Hunter, Christopher Stone, look at the environment.   A snake or landscape that is 
seen as beautiful by the latter may be seen as downright ugly, dangerous and worthless by the 
former.  Whose aesthetic viewpoint should be universalized in this case?    I cannot hope to 
solve this type of difficulty here.  This is because one cannot, and indeed should not, 
physically force people to think in a particular way.  The only solution I can offer is the force 
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of argument.  As rational beings, if we understand our place in nature, and also understand that 
the judgment that nature is beautiful should be a disinterested one, we cannot but see it as 
beautiful.  One can also question the environmental consciousness that informed the judgment 
that nature is ugly.  It could very well be coming from a preconception of what the 
environment is.  Such a preconception could be traced to the religions or cultural views that 
are removed from the environment itself, not seeing what is there but seeing what one has 
been taught to see. A good example is “…St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae who 
held that some animals were satellites of Satan:`instigated by the powers of hell and proper to 
be cursed.`”202 A Kantian solution could also be useful.  Could one universalize the judgment 
that says that nature is beautiful or the one that says that nature is ugly?  What would be the 
implication of both?  I submit that the judgment that nature is beautiful is the one that we as 
rational beings should make.  This is because it holds more promise for an environmental ethic 
that is informed by a proper understanding of our place in nature.  That ethic is the one of 
respect for nature, respect that is born out of the awareness that we share a common origin 
with all the natural entities in the environment.  In this sense, seeing nature as ugly would be 
an aberration, or what Spinoza would call ignorance.  Such ignorance has led to some humans 
who, because of the accident of geography or biology, were born in a certain place, with a 
certain sex, seeing other humans who are different as less human and treating them 
accordingly. 
Genevieve Lloyd, commenting on Spinoza’s environmental ethics, also offered a 
plausible solution when she remarked that “Children who are educated to regard themselves as 
‘but a part of nature’, would for the most part, surely, orientate themselves differently towards 
other species from those who are explicitly taught that man holds a privileged position in the 
universe.”203 Thus, the environmental laws made in such societies would reflect the level of 
their environmental consciousness.  
So, back now to Rolston’s question, cited at the beginning of this conclusion.  It is the 
question he asked and then answered in the affirmative.  “Can aesthetics be an adequate 
foundation for an environmental ethic? This depends on how deep your aesthetics goes.  No, 
where most aestheticians begin, rather shallowly…Yes, increasingly, where aesthetics itself 
                                                          
202  In Linzey, Andre. « For God so loved the World », in Sterba, James P. Earth Ethics, Introductory 
Readings on Animal Rights and Environmental     Ethics, p. 27. 
203 Lloyd, Genevieve. op. cit., p. 87. 
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comes to find and to be founded on natural history, with humans emplacing themselves 
appropriately on such landscapes.  Does environmental ethics need such aesthetics to be 
adequately founded? Yes, indeed.”204 Rolston argues that such aesthetics should lead to a duty.  
One can discern a hesitation, nay an equivocation, when he talks of duty.  This is because, I 
think, he realizes that he cannot take it to mean strictly moral duty.  So he talks equally of 
admiration, caring and respect as synonyms for the kind of duty he was referring to.  
Duty is what is ‘owing’ to others in one’s communities.  Most immediately, this is the 
social community of classical ethics; and now environmental ethics includes the biotic 
community, a land ethic.  What is ‘owing’ to fauna, flora, species, ecosystems, mountains 
and rivers, to Earth, is appropriate respect.  Whether this is better termed ‘caring’ or ‘duty’ 
will no longer be an issue when we feature these natural properties and processes…and 
ask what is an appropriate admiration is for them.  This expanded aesthetics includes 
duties, if you wish to phrase it that way; or this enlarging aesthetics transforms into caring, 
if that is your linguistic preference.205  
 
Although Rolston does not see non-human natural entities as moral beings, he is 
convinced that we should have an ethics of the environment.  From this ethics, two meanings 
of duty can be plausibly distinguished.  The first is the moral duty of “classical ethics”.  It is 
the duty that concerns humans exclusively. The second is how humans treat the non-human 
natural entities in the environment, or “environmental ethics” which includes how we treat the 
biotic community, flora, fauna, mountains, rivers, the Earth.  In this second sense then, ‘Duty’, 
‘admiration’, ‘caring’ and ‘respect’ can all converge into a legal framework that reflects our 
attitude to the environment.  Stone has shown how this type of legal framework could be 
applied.  It is a good way of respecting the wonder that the environment elicits from us. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
204 Rolston,  Holmes. “From Beauty to Duty, Aesthetics of Nature and  Environment Ethics” 
in Environment and the Arts, p. 140. 
205 Ibid p. 140. 
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